



















play	 in	 the	 standard,	 deterministic	 interpretation	 of	 deBroglie’s	 and	 Bohm’s	 Pilot	 Wave	 Theory	 (dBBT),	 by	
considering	 interpretations	 of	 probabilities	 in	 terms	 of	 ignorance,	 typicality	 and	 Humean	 Best	 Systems,	
respectively.	We	argue	that	there	is	an	inherent	conflict	between	dBBT	and	probabilities,	thus	construed.	
The	conflict	originates	in	dBBT’s	deterministic	nature,	rooted	in	the	Guidance	Equation.	Inquiring	into	the	latter’s	
role	 within	 dBBT,	 we	 find	 it	 explanatorily	 redundant	 (in	 particular	 for	 dBBT’s	 solution	 of	 the	Measurement	











and	 other	 stochastic	 hidden-variable	 theories,	 e.g.	 Nelson	 Stochastics,	 or	 between	 sdBBT	 and	 the	 Everett	
interpretation.	
	




































there	 exist	 an	 element	 of	 physical	 reality	 that	 has	 no	 counterpart	 in	 QM?1 	Einstein,	 for	
instance,	was	“[…]	firmly	convinced	that	the	essentially	statistical	character	of	contemporary	
quantum	 theory	 is	 solely	 to	 be	 ascribed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 [theory]	 operates	 with	 an	
incomplete	description	of	physical	systems.”2		
deBroglie-Bohm	Theory	 (dBBT)	 is	 an	attempt	 to	 complete	QM:	 It	 proffers	 an	account	of	 a	
deterministic	dynamics	that	describes	a	sub-quantum	particle	world,	from	which	QM	emerges	





3. What	 precisely	 does	 the	 “statistical	 character”	 of	 QM	 consist	 in	 from	 the	 dBBT	
perspective?	What	is	the	role	and	status	of	probabilities	within	dBBT?		
Our	subsequent	pursuit	of	these	questions	will	put	its	finger	to	what	we’ll	argue	to	be	dBBT’s	
biggest	 shortcoming,	 namely	 the	 joint	 incompatibility	 of	 its	 deterministic	 dynamics,	 its	
probabilistic	Quantum	 Equilibrium	Hypothesis	 and	 its	 aspiration	 to	 a	 thoroughly	 objective	
“quantum	 theory	without	observer.”	As	 a	natural	 and	 conservative	 resolution,	 following	 a	













alternative	 stochastic	 reading	 of	 dBBT	 that	 dispenses	 with	 it:	 stochastic	 deBroglie-Bohm	
Theory	(sdBBT).	The	resulting	theory	is	irreducibly	stochastic	with	the	probabilities	of	the	Born	
Rule	representing	a	disposition	for	a	random	walk	through	configuration	space	(III.2).	In	IV,	we	
critically	examine	 sdBBT,	 its	 status	as	a	minimally	deBroglie-Bohmian	 theory	 (IV.1),	 and	 its	







the	 last	 section	 (V),	we	 summarise	our	main	 findings	 and	 sketch	promising	 lines	of	 future	
enquiry.	II.	dBBT	and	its	discontents	II.1.	Standard	dBBT	
For	a	universe	with	N	corpuscles	of	mass	𝑚" 	each4,	dBBT	consists	of	three	axioms:	
(1) The	 standard,	 non-relativistic	N-particle	 Schrödinger	 Equation	 (SE):	𝑖ℏ %%& 𝜓& 𝒒, 𝑡 =𝐻𝜓&(𝒒, 𝑡) 	with	 the	 wavefunction	𝜓&:	ℝ23×ℝ → ℂ 	and	 the	 N-particle	 Hamiltonian	𝐻 = − ℏ89:;3"<= 𝛁?9 + 𝑉(𝒒, 𝑡)	with	𝛁? = BB𝐪𝐢,	𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁.	
(2) The	Guidance	Equation	(GE),	governing	the	i-th	corpuscle’s	trajectories	(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁):		𝑚" H𝑸;H& = ℏ𝔍𝔪 𝛁;LL :	Given	initial	positions	of	the	corpuscles,	the	GE	determines	their	












the	Born	Rule	(BR),	𝜌 = 𝜓 9.		
The	continuity	equation	𝜕&𝜌L + div𝒋𝝍 = 0	obtained	from	the	SE,	with	the	probability	






space.	More	on	 this	 in	 III.2.	Regarding	 the	wavefunction,	 let’s	preliminarily	accept	 it	 as	an	
entity	that	in	some	way	“pilots”	the	corpuscles.	At	this	stage,	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	its	





a	 system	 initially	 in	 quantum	 non-equilibrium	 relaxes	 into	 quantum	 equilibrium	 –	
analogously	 to	 Boltzmann’s	 H-Theorem.	 The	 results	 hinge	 on	 strong	 assumptions,	
however,	only	little	better	than	just	postulating	the	BR.5		
2. Following	mainstream	presentations	of	dBBT,	we	therefore	include	the	BR	(or	QEH)	as	











But	 how	 convincing	 is	 the	 first	 part	 of	 Bell’s	 answer,	 viz.	 the	 asserted	 analogy	 with	
thermodynamic	equilibrium	(i.e.	the	probability	distribution	of	the	canonical	ensemble,	𝜌 =𝑒[\V]/𝑍,	with	Boltzmann’s	constant	𝑘,	the	classical	Hamiltonian/energy-function,	the	partition	
function	𝑍	and	temperature	𝑇	of	the	equilibrated	system)?8	At	best,	we	submit,	it’s	heuristic:	
• The	 system’s	dynamics	 imposes	 constraints	on	 the	probability	distributions	 in	both	
cases.	(More	on	this	in	II.3).		











• More	 importantly,	 whereas	 in	 the	 thermodynamic	 case,	 the	 classical-mechanical	
Hamiltonian	 (operating,	 with	 its	 double	 role	 as	 energy	 of	 the	 macrosystem	 and	
generator	of	the	dynamics	of	 its	micro-constituents,	on	both	levels)	 links	the	micro-


























and	 then	 uncorked	 in	 vacuum],	 because	 we	 do	 not	 know	 all	 about	 them	 […]”14 .	
Popper,	 in	short,	claims	that	epistemic	probabilities	amount	to	the	absurd	belief	 in	
telekinesis.		
• He	 also	 observes	 the	 incompatibility	 between	 Boltzmannian	 SM	 and	 epistemic	
probabilities:	 Firstly,	 “nescience	 always	 increases,	 provided	 we	 do	 not	 start	 with	




would,	 in	 all	 probability,	 immediately	 become	 disordered	 again,	 according	 to	
Boltzmann.”15		
• Furthermore,	Popper	maintains,	 the	probability-subjectivist	 cannot	explain	 the	 fact	





i.e.	 the	degree	of	 subjective	certainty;	by	contrast,	epistemic	probability	assignments,	capture	an	 individual’s	
certainty	 relative	 to	 the	 information	 available	 to	 them.	 In	 other	 words,	 epistemic	 probabilities	 express	 an	










As	 Frigg	 points	 out,	 however,	 a	misconception	 underlies	 these	 objections:17	Espousing	 an	
epistemic	view	on	probability	doesn’t	 imply	 that	our	beliefs	or	 lack	of	knowledge	cause	or	
bring	 about	 the	 physical	 facts.	 Epistemic	 probabilities	 only	 explain	 “why	 or	 when	 it	 is	
reasonable	to	expect	[gases	to	disperse,	ice	cubes	to	melt,	or	coffee	to	mix].”18		




And	 indeed,	 dBBT	 expressly	 aspires	 after	 a	 realist,	 objectivist	 “quantum	 theory	 without	
observer”	(Popper).21	In	particular,	dBBT	intends	to	be	able	to	describe	fundamental	reality	
even	in	the	absence	of	any	epistemic	subjects	who	could	have	any	“reasonable	expectations”,	
such	 as	 in	 the	 early	 phases	 of	 the	 universe.	 (Note	 that	 such	 deviations	 from	 Quantum	
Equilibrium	elicit	physical	effects,	which	leave	objective,	in	principle	detectable	traces	in	the	
cosmic	 microwave	 background. 22 )	 Thus,	 the	 question	 still	 looms:	 How	 do	 epistemic	
probabilities	 fit	 into	 its	otherwise	 realist,	objectivist/subject-free	 framework?	We’ll	 further	
pursue	that	line	of	thought	shortly.		
One	might	bypass	the	problem	if	dBBT’s	probabilities	turned	out	not	really	to	be	probabilities	
directly	 expressing	 chance-related	 quantities,	 but	 something	 like	 constraints	 on	 all	
conceivable	 statistical	 initial	 distributions	 of	 Bohmian	 corpuscles.	 Let’s	 ponder:	 How	 to	
understand	 the	 continuous	 BR-probability	 distribution	 𝜌&b(𝑸) ≔ 𝜓(𝑸) 9 	vis-à-vis	 the	
corpuscles’	 discrete	 distributions	 of	 the	 form	 𝜌d:e(𝑸):= =3 𝛿(𝑸 − 𝒒𝒊)3"<= ,	 with	𝒒𝒊	 the	













“theoretical	 distribution”)	must	 approximate	 the	 latter	 (the	 “empirical	 distribution”):	 “The	






condition	 of	 our	 universe:	 Firstly,	 the	 constraint	 itself	 evolves	 dynamically	 –	 against	 the	
intuition	that	boundary/initial	conditions	should	be	fixed.	Secondly,	the	Schrödinger	Equation,	
which	 governs	 this	 dynamics,	 is	 a	 partial	 differential	 equation.	 Hence,	 it	 requires	 the	
specification	of	contingent	initial	data	for	the	wavefunction.	In	other	words:	QEH,	construed	
as	 a	 contingent	 constraint,	 in	 turn,	 is	 subject	 to	 another	 contingent	meta-constraint.	 This	








The	 analogy	 with	 SM,	 fickle	 as	 it	 may	 be,	 raises	 the	 question:	 Might	 Boltzmann’s	 own	
understanding	 of	 probabilities	 in	 his	 approach	 to	 SM	 bail	 us	 out?25	Here,	 the	 probability	
measure	figures	as	a	modal	measure	of	how	typical/common	certain	sets	of	phase-space	are.	
A	 statement	 involving	 an	 equilibrium	 macrostate	 with	 typicality	 measure	 (“t-measure”,	







configurations	 –	 or	 equivalently,	 since	 the	 dynamics	 preserves	 the	measure,	 initial	micro-







induces	 a	 t-measure	ℙlm ≔ Ψn 9 .	 A	 Law	 of	 Large	 Numbers	 then	 establishes	 that	 typical	





can	be	decomposed	as	∀ x, y ∈ 𝑋×𝑌:Ψ x, y = ψ x ϕ y + Ψv 𝑥, 𝑦 ,	
where	ϕ	and	Ψv	have	macroscopically	disjoint	y-support	and	𝑌 ⊆ supp ϕ .	Subsystems	with	
an	effective	wavefunction	and	negligible	 interaction	with	 its	environment	can	be	shown	to	
satisfy	the	SE	for	ψ.	
For	 subsystems	 with	 the	 same	 wavefunction	 ψ ,	 the	 ℙl -measure,	 conditional	 on	 all	
environmental	 configurations	 Y	 that	 yield	 to	 the	 same	 effective	 wavefunction	 ψ ,	 is	
determined	(independent	of	Y)	as:		ℙl 𝑸 = 𝑋, 𝑌 : 𝑋 ∈ 𝑑~𝑥 Ψ . , Y = ψ: 𝑌 = ψ 9𝑑~𝑥.	
																																																						






of	N	 identically	 prepared	 subsystems	 with	 the	 effective	 wavefunction	𝜓 	and	 the	 position	
random	variables	𝑋",	it	holds	that		










usual	motivation/justification	of	 the	 Lebesgue-measure	 (a	 justification,	 however,	 Frigg	 has	
argued	 to	 be	 fundamentally	 misguided29).	 In	 dBBT,	 the	 notion	 of	 equivariance30 	suitably	
generalises	 stationarity:	 Imposing	 it	 uniquely	 determines	 Ψn 9 	as	 the	 t-measure 31 	that	
depends	 only	 locally	 on	Ψn	 and	 its	 derivatives	 –	 a	 far	 more	 satisfactory	 picture!	 Their	




‘Which	 initial	 distribution	 is	 the	 correct	 one?’	 involves	 no	 dynamics,	 nor	 is	 it	 clear	 why	
																																																						
28	Oldofredi	et	al.	(2016),	pp.15	











• Albeit	 a	measure	over	possible	 –	hence,	by	 standard	accounts33,	non-real	 –	world-
configurations,	 the	 t-measure, 	ℙlm = Ψn 9 ,	 satisfies	 a	 dynamical	 law	 –	 usually	
characteristic	 of	 real	 properties.	 (We’ll	 revisit	 this	 argument	 in	 a	 different	 context	
more	in	detail	in	III.2.)	
The	dynamical	nature	of	the	wavefunction	has	an	important	implication:	Insofar	that	
typicality	 quantifies	 how	 common	 a	 trait	 is	 amidst	 the	 space	 of	 nomological	
possibilities,	 a	 typicality	 statement	 shouldn’t	 be	 contingent,	 that	 is,	 vary	 across	
different	 possible	 worlds.	 But	 since	 the	 wavefunction,	 qua	 SE,	 requires	 the	
specification	of	initial	conditions	that	characterise	a	particular	world,	ℙlm 	measure	is	
contingent,	as	well.	Therefore	it	cannot	be	a	measure	of	typicality.	
• More	oddities	 are	 in	 the	 offing:	 Even	 if,	 as	we	 reported,	 dBBT’s	 t-measure,	ℙlm =Ψn 9,	is	unique	and	to	some	extent	appears	plausible,	one	must	be	wary	of	concluding	
that	sets	of	measure	zero	w.r.t.	ℙlm 	(e.g.	the	set	of	initial	conditions	for	which	the	GE	
is	well-defined,	see	III.1)	are	small34:	Sets	of	measure	zero	in	general	needn’t	be	small	
at	 all	 in	 any	 mundane	 sense:	 Think,	 for	 example,	 of	 the	 infinitely	 many	 rational	


















called	normal	number	𝑧 = 𝑑=, 𝑑9, … ,	 i.e.	one	 in	which	each	digit	 i	 occurs	equally	
often	(with	equal	t-measure	𝜇( 𝑖 ) = ==),	such	that	of	the	first	M	digits	every	other	
number	is	seven:	𝑧∗ ≔ 7, 𝑑=∗, 7, 𝑑9∗ … ,	where	the	𝑑"∗’s	are	obtained	from	deleting	all	
7’s	 from	 the	 first	 M	𝑑" ’s.	 Of	 course,	 the	 rearrangement	 z*	 doesn’t	 change	 the	
frequency	 with	 which	 7	 occurs;	 its	 t-measure	 is	 preserved	 under	 finitely	 many	
permutations,	∀𝑖: 𝜇∗ 𝑖 = 𝜇( 𝑖 ).	Yet,	by	looking	at	𝑧∗,	it	appears	that	every	other	
number	is	7,	i.e.	that	𝜇∗ 7 = =9.		
The	immediate	lesson	is:	Without	randomisation	that	suitably	mixes	the	results,	a	high	









loses	 its	 empirical	 content.	 But	 then,	what’s	 the	point	 of	 an	 allegedly	 fundamental	
theory	without	 empirical	 content?	 So,	we	wind	 up	where	we	 started:	Whence	 the	
randomness	in	the	otherwise	deterministic	dBBT	universe?	
• One	way	out	of	the	preceding	problem	is	to	simply	assume	that	our	dBBT	universe	or	
any	 other	 system	 we’re	 interested	 in	 is	 typical,	 i.e.	 started	 from	 typical	 initial	












We	 already	 encountered	 such	 an	 epistemic	 manoeuvre,	 and	 dismissed	 it	 as	
endangering	the	Bohmian	objectivist	agenda.	M	
Perhaps	 more	 to	 the	 point,	 even	 any	 connection	 between	 typicality	 and	 “rational	
expectability”	 is	questionable.	Conceptually,	 a	 t-measure	 refers	 to	 the	 collection	of	
possible	 worlds/systems.	 In	 essence,	 such	 a	 collection	 of	 systems	 is	 a	
canonical/Gibbsian	ensemble,	as	known	from	Gibbsian	SM.37	Thus,	its	use	is	subject	to	
the	same	criticism	as	in	the	Gibbsian	case.38	
In	 particular,	 dBBT	 claims	 universal	 applicability,	 encompassing	 the	 universe	 as	 a	
whole.	The	latter	doesn’t	have	any	copies,	though.	And	given	that,	for	all	we	know,	
there’s	 only	 one	 universe,	 why	 should	 it	 be	 “rational	 to	 expect”	 it	 to	 be	 a	 typical	
member	 of	 all	 conceivable	 universes?	 It’s	 true	 that	 multiverse	 speculations	 have	




We	 conclude	 that	 it’s	 not	 even	 clear	 how	 typicality	 should	 even	 matter	 to	 a	 substantial	
interpretation	of	dBBT	–	let	alone	how	it	would	settle	the	status	of	its	probabilities.		II.3.2.	Humean	Best	Systems	





many	 phenomena	 does	 it	 cover?)	 and	 fit	 (how	 exact	 are	 the	 predictions	 of	 the	



























• A	 more	 severe	 problem	 springs	 from	 the	 non-separable	 nature	 of	 dBBT’s	
wavefunction.	 To	 formulate	 this	 popular	 argument,	 let’s	 inspect	 Maudlin’s	 more	


















































Consequently,	 by	 declaring	 the	 wavefunction	 supervenient,	 its	 non-separability	 (more	
precisely,	its	non-factorisability)	becomes	innocuous	–	merely	a	mathematical	peculiarity	of	a	




in	 classical	 field	 theories.	 Hence,	 this	 ontological	 re-classification	 of	 the	 wavefunction	 (in	
principle,	independent	from	any	commitment	to	Humeanism)	is	known	as	the	“Nomological	
View”.	
Is	 the	Humean	Bohmian	now	off	 the	hook	with	 resorting	 to	 the	Nomological	View?	Three	
objections,	we	submit,	mar	her	hopes:	
• Whilst	Humeanism	delimits	which	entities	count	as	fundamental	and	correspond	to	
something	 real	 (viz.	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 Mosaic),	 and	 which	 don’t	 (viz.	 laws,	
irreducible	dispositions,	etc.),	it	procures	no	criteria	for	ascertaining	whether	a	certain	
theoretical	 term	 should	 be	 classified	 as	 representing	 an	 element	 of	 the	Mosaic	 or	
merely	 “nomological”.	 In	 particular,	 declaring	 the	 wavefunction	 as	 “nomological”	















entities:	 If	 the	 wavefunction	 is	 law-like,	 the	 SE,	 as	 the	 law	 that	 determines	 the	
wavefunction,	would	 consequently	 be	 “meta-law”-like;	 in	 turn,	 the	GE,	 as	 the	 law	
governing	via	the	wavefunction	the	dynamics	of	the	corpuscle	positions,	would	ought	
to	be	seen	as	“hypo-law”-like.	Both	meta-laws	and	hypo-laws	come	in	two	flavours:	







other	 words:	 For	 such	 a	 liberalised	 Humeanism,	 law-likeness	 and	 non-fundamentality	 are	
synonymous.	(Consequently,	even	mass	or	charge	in	e.g.	Esfeld’s	similar	proposal	for	a	liberal	
“Quantum	Humeanism”53,	on	which	 the	Mosaic	 consists	only	of	points	 in	 spacetime	being	
either	occupied	or	empty,	would	count	as	“law-like”.)		
However,	 whether	 this	 liberalisation	 ameliorates	 the	 Humean	 Bohmian’s	 predicament	 is	


































adherent	 of	 Brown’s	 Dynamical	 Approach	 to	 symmetry 57 ,	 for	 instance,	 would	
furthermore	 flat-out	 dismiss	 that	 justification	 as	 putting	 the	 cart	 before	 the	 horse,	
insisting	that	the	spacetime	symmetries	be	derived	from	the	dynamics/the	GE,	not	the	

















differs	 from	 the	 ordinary	 GE,	 despite	 empirical	 equivalence.	 Since	 the	 Dirac-Bohm	




As	we’ll	 argue	 in	 the	 subsequent	 section,	 the	GE	 is	 empirically	 inaccessible,	 vastly	
underdetermined	 and	 serves	 no	 explanatory	 function	 –	 a	 strong	 incentive	 for	 the	
Humean	 to	 simply	 abandon	 the	 GE,	 and	 thereby	 dBBT	 altogether,	 in	 favour	 of	 a	
statistical	 theory	 of	 random	 corpuscle	 jumps	 –	 an	 option	we’ll	 explore	 in	 detail	 in	
section	III.		
Dewar	poignantly	adumbrates	the	same	idea:	“The	problem	is	that	our	evidence	for	
quantum	mechanics	 is	 (famously)	statistical	 in	nature.	 It	 is	not	 that	we	have	direct	
access	 to	 some	 small	 number	 of	 the	 Bohmian	 trajectories,	 and	 have	 successfully	
stitched	those	together	by	overlaying	a	wavefunction	governed	by	quantum	dynamics.	
What	 we	 have	 instead	 are	 individual	 but	 imprecise	 measurements	 of	 positions	 at	
particular	times.	[…]	So	what	we	have	really	woven	together	into	a	quantum	tapestry	
are	 those	probability	densities,	 rather	 than	 the	 trajectories	 themselves;	and	on	 the	
Bohmian’s	 own	 account,	 those	 probability	 densities	 represent	 all	 that	 can	 ever	 be	
known	for	sure	about	the	trajectories.”58	
In	short,	a	Humean,	upon	re-examining	the	GE,	will	have	good	reasons	not	to	consider	
dBBT	 the	 simplest	 systematisation;	 a	 Humean	 couching	 of	 dBBT	 thus	 seems	 self-
defeating.		
	









randomness	 of	 the	 particle	 position	 translates	 into	 the	 randomness	 of	 the	 particle’s	








“most	 detailed	 knowledge	 possible	 concerning	 the	 present	 configuration	 of	 a	
subsystem	(of	which	the	‘observer’	or	‘knower’	is	not	part	[…].”60	
This	 starkly	 contrasts	 with	 the	 objectivism	 officially	 professed	 by	 many	 of	 dBBT’s	




• Secondly,	 note	 in	 Dürr/Teufel’s	 cited	 account	 their	 remark	 that	 corpuscles’	 initial	
positions	are	randomly	distributed.		
Is	 it	actually	meaningful	 to	apportion	randomness	to	 initial	conditions?	Prima	facie,	
only	stochastic	processes,	e.g.	Poisson	processes	such	as	radioactive	decay,	can	display	
randomness;	by	contrast,	initial	conditions	are	brute	fact	data.	Moreover,	even	if	one	
grants	 the	 meaningfulness	 of	 randomness	 in	 initial	 conditions,	 we’re	 back	 in	 our	















same	authors	paradoxically	negate	 that:	 “It	 looks	 as	 if	 objective	 chance	 is	 at	work,	
while	in	truth	it	is	not.	There	is	no	chance.”62	How	to	resolve	this	contradiction?	
Pledging	allegiance	to	its	objectivist	outlook,	might	perhaps	we	re-cast	dBBT	–	or	at	least,	its	









the	 GE	 (𝑸" ∝ 𝔍𝔪 𝛁;LL )	 will	 steer	 corpuscles	 into	 that	 set	 of	 zeros,	 where	 the	 GE	
becomes	singular.	Thus,	it	isn’t	well-defined	for	all	of	configuration	space.		
Although	the	set	of	initial	conditions	that	lead	to	singularities	is	of	measure	zero63,	this	




• Another	 formal	 discontent	 is	 levelled	 at	 GE’s	 non-uniqueness:	 Are	 different	 GEs	
possible?	Indeed,	the	orthodox	GE	given	above,	𝑸 = 𝒋	with	the	quantum	probability	
flux	 𝒋 = ℏ9":V 𝔍𝔪 𝜓∗𝛁ψ U 	and	 the	 probability	 density	𝜌 = 𝜓 ,	 is	 but	 one	 of	 an	












The	orthodox	GE	has	 been	 argued	 to	 be	 the	 simplest	 such	 choice	 compatible	with	
Galilean	and	time-reversal	invariance.66		







supersede	 CM:	 So,	 why	 should	 we	 assume	 dBBT’s	 GE	 to	 inherit	 CM’s	 spacetime	
structure?	 Thirdly,	 relativistic	 generalisations	 of	 dBBT	 in	 fact	 speak	 against	 this	
putatively	simplest	choice	of	the	GE:	Plugging	the	quantum	probability	4-current	of	the	
Dirac	equation	(see	section	IV.5.4),	i.e.	𝑗¡ = 𝑐𝜓£𝛾¡𝜓	(with	the	Dirac	matrices	𝛾¡,	and	



















• As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 dBBT	 is	 empirically	 indistinguishable	 from	 QM.	 How	 is	 this	
achieved?	 The	 equivalence	 in	 no	 way	 depends	 on	 the	 GE. 70 	Let’s	 recall	 the	 two	
ingredients	for	ensuring	empirical	equivalence	with	ordinary	QM:	
o The	BR	delivers	the	right	probability	for	finding	a	dBBT-corpuscle	at	a	certain	
position.	 For	 position	measurements,	 this	 coincides	 with	 the	 predictions	 of	
standard	QM.	
o dBBT’s	ontology	procures	the	rest:	In	dBBT,	there	are	no	dynamical	properties	
other	 than	 position;	 what	 we	 usually	 interpret	 as	 such	 properties,	 e.g.	
momentum	or	spin,	are	only	manifestations	of	the	wavefunction	and	how	it	
guides	 the	particles	positions.	When	 it	comes	to	observable	effects,	 though,	
the	statistics	obeys	the	BR.	
In	 consequence,	 the	empirical	 content	of	 dBBT	 is	 independent	of	 the	deterministic	
trajectories	of	the	dBBT	corpuscles;	the	GE	eschews	empirical	accessibility.	
Remark:	 It’s	 instructive	 to	 note	 how	 dBBT	 circumvents	 the	 two	 principal	 no-go	
theorems	for	hidden	variables	theories71:	Since	all	the	theoretical	work	is	done	by	the	
wavefunction,	which	enters	both	the	GE	and	the	BR,	and	the	latter	 is	“non-local”	 in	
that	 it	 involves	 the	non-separable/non-factorisable	wavefunction,	 Bell’s	 Theorem	 is	















variables	agenda,	 the	Measurement	Problem	more	precisely	 consists	 in	 the	mutual	
inconsistency	 of	 the	 three	 assumptions	 that	 the	 wavefunction	 is	 complete,	 that	 it	
evolves	 in	 accord	 with	 the	 Schrödinger	 dynamics	 and	 that	 measurements	 yield	
determinate	outcomes,	respectively.72		
dBBT	 has	 been	 argued	 to	 its	 most	 convincing	 solution	 –	 by	 denying	 that	 the	
wavefunction	 alone	 completely	 specifies	 the	 physical	 state: 73 	Only	 the	 pair	
wavefunction	and	corpuscles’	position,	(Ψ,𝑸),	(rather	than	the	wavefunction	alone,	












the	 first	measurement	 is	 completed,	we	are	 in	 a	position	 to	 know	more	about	 the	
















• It	has	been	argued	that	 the	GE	 in	some	sense	explains	dBBT’s	peculiar	ontology,	 in	
which	 corpuscles	 have	 positions	 as	 their	 only	 non-contextual	 dynamical	 variables:	
“Bohmian	Mechanics	 should	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 first-order	 theory,	 in	which	 it	 is	 the	
velocity	[…]	that	is	fundamental	in	that	it	is	this	quantity	that	is	specified	by	the	theory,	
directly	and	simply	[…].	[…]	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	second-order	concepts	[viz.	




interpretation	 or	 ontology.	 Consequently,	 the	 formalism	 cannot	 explain	 (in	 any	




who	praises	 its	naturalness	and	cogency80	without	any	 reference	 to	 the	GE:	 “[…]	 in	
physics	the	only	observations	we	must	consider	are	position	observations,	if	only	the	
positions	of	instrument	pointers.	It	is	a	great	merit	of	the	deBroglie-Bohm	picture	to	


















o The	 idiosyncrasies	 of	 dBBT’s	 ontological	 framework,	 with	 its	 dualist	
wavefunction-point	 particle	 ontology,	 contextuality,	 etc.,	 drastically	 depart	
from	any	classical	picture,	to	begin	with.83		
o Also	 from	 a	 less	 philosophical	 angle,	 the	 “surrealistic”	 trajectories	 are	
misleading:	“The	Bohm	trajectory	is	[…]	macroscopically	at	variance	with	the	
actual,	 that	 is:	 observed	 track”84 ;	 semi-classical	 dBBT	 trajectories	 in	 semi-
classical	situations	differ	strongly	from	classical	trajectories.85		
Einstein’s	objection	to	dBBT	from	1953	takes	up	this	point	(already	articulated	by	Pauli	
much	 earlier	 in	 regards	 to	 deBroglie’s	 original	 pilot-wave	 theory	 from	 1927)	 and	
couples	it	to	a	methodological	principle.86	He	considers	a	one-dimensional	particle	in	
a	 perfectly	 elastic	 box	 of	 length	 L,	 centred	 around	 zero.	 Inside	 the	 box,	 the	
corresponding	energy	eigenfunctions	are	superpositions	of	plane	waves	travelling	to	
the	right	and	left,	respectively:		
𝜑~ 𝑥, 𝑡 = 2 ∤ 𝑛:	 12L cos 𝑛𝜋𝑥𝐿 𝑒["ℏ²²´²8µ¶²&2|𝑛:	 12L sin 𝑛𝜋𝑥𝐿 𝑒["ℏ²²´²8µ¶²& .	
The	GE	then	yields	a	vanishing	velocity	at	all	times	–	a	result	that	“contradicts	the	well-




















contextuality)	 and	 the	 QEH/BR,	 whose	 conjunction	 alone	 warrants	 that	 all	 predictions	 of	







walk	 through	 configuration	 space:	 The	 corpuscles	 spontaneously	 jump	 between	
possible	positions.	
• Their	 random	 localisations	 notwithstanding,	 at	 every	 instance	 they	 have	 definite	
positions.	All	other	dynamical	properties,	 like	 in	the	standard	dBBT	ontology,	which	
sdBBT	inherits	from	dBBT,	are	only	derivative/contextualised.	III.	2.	Probabilities	in	sdBBT	
Let’s	examine	in	more	detail	now	sdBBT’s	probability	space	 ℝ2¹,𝒜, ℙ ,	with	configuration	
space	ℝ2¹ 	as	 the	 so-called	 sample	 space,	 the	𝜎-algebra90	of	 “events”	𝒜	generated	by	ℝ2¹	
(i.e.	 the	 Borel	 set)	 and	 the	 Born-probability	 measure	𝑑ℙ = 𝜓 9𝑑23𝑸. 91 	We	 propose	 the	
following	(non-Popperian92)	propensity	interpretation93:	



















(disposition	 or	 propensity)	 to	 spontaneously,	 randomly	 materialise	 or	 jump	 into	
existence	in	a	certain	configuration	at	a	certain	instance	in	time:	The	manifestation	of	




requires	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 triggering	 mechanism	 –	 as	 a	 literal	 reading	 of	 sdBBT’s	
formalism	seems	to	call	for.		
Note	 that	 the	 corpuscles’	 spontaneous	 localisation	 isn’t	 a	 “collapse	 of	 the	
wavefunction”:	 The	 disposition	 continues	 to	 evolve	 unitarily	 also	 after	 its	
manifestation.	
The	 probability	 measure	 quantifies	 the	 strength	 of	 such	 a	 propensity 94 ,	 with	 a	




has	 the	 greatest	 tendency	 to	 become	 actualised.	 (Dispositionalism	 suggests	 a	
modification	of	the	notion	of	(nomological)	impossibility:	An	event	may	be	said	to	be	




spontaneous	 materialisations	 and	 de-materialisations	 apparently	 contradict	 the	
received	metaphysical	 principle	 of	 substance	 conservation,	 i.e.	 that	 substances	 can	
neither	spontaneously	emerge	nor	perish.96	Dispositionalism	avoids	the	conflict	with	
that	principle,	though,	since	firstly	the	N	corpuscles’	disposition	to	localise	themselves	






















While	 the	 Reference	 Class	 Problem	 notoriously	 plagues	 frequentism	 and	 long-run	
propensities,	 sdBBT	 –	 like	 most	 variants	 of	 QM 98 	–	 escapes	 it 99 :	 The	 system’s	




the	 price	 of	 a	 vacuous	 notion	 of	 propensity:100	Indeed,	 propensity	 approaches	 are	
often	 dismissed	 as	 pseudo-explanatory	 of	 the	 type	 a	 quack	 physician	 dishes	 up	 in	



















o In	 turn,	 probabilities	 formalise	 and	 quantify	 the	 vaguer,	 pre-theoretical,	
qualitative	and	ontological	notion	of	a	propensity:	“How	to	render	the	concept	
of	 a	 propensity	 sufficiently	 mathematically	 precise?”	 To	 this	 end,	
Kolmogorow’s	 axioms	 are	 imposed	 as	 formal	 desiderata,	 whose	motivation	
(esp.	that	of	𝜎-addivity)	shall	not	concern	us	here.	Once	imposed,	probabilistic	
statements,	 thus	 rendered	 quantitative,	 can	 subsequently	 be	 subjected	 to	
empirical	tests.102	




Consider	a	partition	 𝐵": 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 	of	the	sample	space	of	physical	states	of	some	system,	
Ω = 𝐵""∈¿ ,	 with	∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑘:	𝐵" ∩ 𝐵U = ∅ ,	 and	 let	A ∈ Ω 	be	 an	 event.	 Then,	 Bayes’	
Theorem	purports:	∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼:	ℙ 𝐵" 𝐴 = ℙ(Ã Ä;)ℙ(Ä;)ℙ(Ã ÄÅ)ℙ(ÄÅ)Å∈Æ .	What	does	this	signify	in	terms	
of	propensities?		
It	seems	natural	to	interpret	the	conditional	probability	ℙ(𝐴 𝐵")	as	the	propensity	of	
the	 system	to	undergo	 the	 transition	𝐵" ↝	A.	This	 suggests	 to	understand	𝐵" 	as	 the	
cause	 of	 the	 effect	 𝐴 ,	 and	 hence	 conditional	 probabilities	 as	 representing	 a	
probabilistic	form	of	causation.		










vice	 versa;	 causal	 chains	 of	 events	 cannot	 be	 inversed.	 Probabilities	 therefore,	 the	
argument	concludes,	cannot	be	understood	in	terms	of	propensities.	
A	closer	inspection	of	the	paradox	is	apposite.	Three	groups	of	posits	enter	it:	
(i) We	 adopt	 standard	 probability	 calculus,	 with	 probability	 measures	 obeying	
Kolmogorow’s	axioms.	
(ii) The	 second	 group	 of	 posits	 comprises	 assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	
propensities	(denoted	by	𝔓,	time-indexed	w.r.t.	𝑡= < 𝑡9 < 𝑡2)	in	a	causal	process	𝐴(𝑡=) ↝ 𝐵(𝑡9) ↝ 𝐶 𝑡2 	(i.e.	chain	of	events,	𝐴,	𝐵	and	𝐶):	
a. The	 propensity	 of	 the	 process	 𝐴(𝑡=) ↝ 𝐵 𝑡9 	is	 nontrivial:	1 > 𝔓&Ê 𝐵 𝑡9 𝐴(𝑡=) > 0	
b. The	propensity	of	the	causal	chain	isn’t	minimal	:		𝔓&Ê 𝐶 𝑡2 𝐴 𝑡= ∧ 𝐵 𝑡9 > 0.	
c. In	 the	 absence	of	𝐵,	 the	 process	𝐴(𝑡=) ↝ 𝐶 𝑡2 	has	minimal	 propensity:	𝔓&Ê 𝐶 𝑡2 𝐴 𝑡= ∧ ¬𝐵 𝑡9 = 0.	
d. Future	 events	 are	 causally	 neutral/irrelevant	 for	 past	 events:	𝔓&Ê 𝐵 𝑡9 𝐴 𝑡= ∧ 𝐶 𝑡2 = 𝔓&Ê 𝐵 𝑡9 𝐴 𝑡= ∧ ¬𝐶 𝑡2= 𝔓&Ê 𝐵 𝑡9 𝐴 𝑡= 	
(iii) The	 last	 posit	 bridges	 (i)	 and	 (ii),	with	 an	 identity	 thesis,	 according	 to	which	 all	
propensities	𝔓&	can	be	uniquely	associated	with	probabilities,	with	the	strength	𝜎	
of	the	propensity	being	identified	with	the	probability:		𝔓& → ℙ&, ∀𝑥: 	𝔓& 𝑥 ↦ 𝜎 𝔓& 𝑥 ≡ ℙ& 𝑥 	
Humphreys’	Paradox	now	consists	in	the	inconsistency	that	arises	from	the	conjunction	of	








propensity	 interpretation;	 some	 conditional	 probabilities	 in	 particular	 don’t	 refer	 to	
factually	possible	transitions	in	the	world.	This	isn’t	unfamiliar	from	other	theories	whose	
formalism	also	 treats	physically	 impossible	 situations,	 forbidden	by	extra-mathematical	
selection	 rules.	 E.g.	 in	 standard	 QM,	 N-particle	 wavefunctions	 transform	 either	




have	 indeed	 abolished	 the	 identity	 thesis	 by	 asserting	 "that	 GRW	 propensities	 are	 all	
forward-looking	 in	 time” 105 	–	 a	 “response	 that	 any	 advocate	 of	 objective	 quantum	
probabilities	will	wish	to	make.”106	
In	addition	to	abandoning	the	 identity	thesis	 (iii),	sdBBT	compels	us	to	abandon	 (iic):	 It	
captures	 the	 intuition	 that	 in	 a	 causal	 chain	𝐴(𝑡=) ↝ 𝐵(𝑡9) ↝ 𝐶 𝑡2 	the	 intermediary	
event	B	is	indispensable;	i.e.	in	B’s	absence,	the	chain	has	minimal	propensity	to	occur.	In	
sdBBT,	however,	the	corpuscles’	configurations	spontaneously	and	randomly	jump	from	
one	 instant	 to	 another,	 independently	 of	 previous	 configurations;	 sequences	 of	
configurations	are	no	longer	causally	connected.	In	other	words,	there	exists	no	triplet	of	
events	that	satisfies	(iic);	in	sdBBT	(iic)	is	violated.	Humphreys’	Paradox	thus	lapses.	















realism”);	 we’ll	 then	 argue	 that	 viewing	 the	 wavefunction	 more	 specifically	 as	 a	 real,	
dispositional	quantity	overcomes	the	key	problems	of	wavefunction	realism.		
Above,	we	declared	the	corpuscles’	propensity	a	real/physical	property,	represented	by	the	
wavefunction.	 This	 wavefunction	 realism	 naturally	 accounts	 for	 the	 wavefunction’s	
contingency,	structural	complexity	and	time-evolution108:		
• The	wavefunction	has	dynamical	degrees	of	freedom	of	its	own,	governed	by	the	SE	
and	dependent	on	 initial/boundary	 conditions.	Varying	across	different	worlds	 that	
differ	 in	 those	 conditions,	 the	 wavefunction	 consequently	 represents	 a	 contingent	
quantity	–	as	opposed	to	absolute	objects,	which	don’t	vary	across	possible	worlds,	
e.g.	 the	 Minkowski	 spacetime	 metric	 in	 Special	 Relativity.	 Contingency	 is	 seen	 as	
characteristic	of	real	entities	–	as	opposed	to	merely	conventional	ones.		
As	Brown	and	Wallace	suggestively	point	out,	“(h)istorically,	it	was	exactly	when	the	




• Its	 contingency	 also	 implies	 that	we	 can	 to	 some	extent	 control	 the	wavefunction,	
insofar	as	we	can	prepare	a	physical	system	via	initial	and	boundary	conditions.	This	
controllability	 speaks	 strongly	 against	 a	 nomological	 interpretation	 of	 the	








not	 controllable.	 Taking	 up	 their	 invocation	 of	 God,	 one	 needs	 to	 distinguish	 between	 two	 forms	 of	 Divine	
intervention:	On	the	one	hand,	God’s	thaumaturgical	ability	to	suspend	the	extant	laws	of	nature,	and	on	the	
other	hand	his	weakly	and	strongly	demiurgical	ability	to	create	worlds:	The	former	refers	to	the	ability	to	create	
distinct	 nomologically	 possible	 worlds,	 differing	 only	 w.r.t.	 contingent	 elements,	 such	 as	 initial/boundary	
conditions,	 while	 the	 non-contingent	 (“nomological”)	 elements	 remain	 the	 same;	 strong	 demiurgy	 refers	 to	
God’s	ability	to	create	worlds	in	which	different	laws	of	nature	hold.		





16	 coupled	 hyperbolic-elliptic	 nonlinear	 PDEs,	 sdBBT’s	 wavefunction-dependent	
propensity	is	structurally	very	rich.		
In	both	sdBBT	and	dBBT,	this	structural	complexity	mirrors	its	ontological	importance	











wavefunction	 carries	 itself	 properties	 or	 not;	 the	 former	 would	 suggest	 its	 status	 as	 a	
substance.		
Given	the	dependence	of	the	wavefunction	–	as	a	solution	to	the	SE	–	on	parameters	such	as	
mass	or	 charge,	Holland	has	 proposed	 that	 the	wavefunction	 itself	 should	be	 regarded	 as	
massive,	charged	etc.113	Discussing	neutron	interferometric	thought	experiments,	Brown	et	
al.	 elaborate	 this	 proposal	 to	 attribute	 the	 state-independent,	 non-dynamical	 properties	














position	 ascription,	 ignore	 another	 traditional	 category	 feature	 of	 substances,	 viz.	
independence:	Via	QEH	and	 the	GE,	 respectively,	 the	 corpuscles’	 initial	 configurations	and	
behaviour	are	determined	by	the	wavefunction.	(A	converse	dependence	of	the	wavefunction	
on	 the	 corpuscles	doesn’t	 obtain	–	 an	 issue	we’ll	 discuss	 in	 III.3.).	 In	 consequence,	 dBBT’s	
ontology	is	a	substance-dualism	consisting	of	one	bona	fide	substance,	viz.	the	wavefunction,	
and	one	entity,	viz.	the	corpuscles,	whose	ontological	category	is	ambivalent;	the	fact	that	the	




dynamical	 properties	 also	 to	 the	 wavefunction,	 sdBBT	 needn’t	 classify	 the	 latter	 as	 a	
substance:	 The	wavefunction	 represents	 corpuscles’	 disposition	 of	 spontaneously	 popping	
into	 existence,	 both	 localising	 themselves	 at	 certain	 sites	 with	 certain	 masses,	 charges,	
magnetic	momenta,	etc.	Thus,	sdBBT’s	corpuscles	are	the	only	substances.	They	are	ascribed	
properties,	 which	 fall	 into	 two	 inter-related	 types	 –	 the	 disposition	 of	 spontaneous	
materialisation,	 represented	by	 the	wavefunction,	 and	 the	 corresponding	manifestation	of	
that	disposition	of	the	corpuscles	to	randomly	localise	themselves	at	certain	positions,	with	
certain	 state-independent	 properties.	 That	 the	 wavefunction	 is	 defined	 on	 configuration	
space,	 and	 that	 the	 corpuscles	 and	 the	 wavefunction	 can	 both	 be	 attributed	 the	 state-
independent	 properties,	 now	 simply	 reflects	 the	 ontological	 dependence	 between	
dispositions	and	their	manifestations.		













in	which	 quantum	 systems	 in	 entangled	 states	 possess	 properties	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
definite	 values;	 […]	 a	 clear	 transition	 from	 quantum	 to	 classical	 properties;	 […]	 a	 clear	
transition	 from	 quantum	 to	 classical	 structures;	 and	 […]	 [the	 grounding	 of]	 the	 arrow	 of	
time.”119	
The	 crucial	 advantage	 of	 dispositionalism	 in	 our	 context	 at	 hand,	 we	 submit,	 is	 that	 the	
dispositional	 character	 of	 the	 wavefunction	 can	 straightforwardly	 account	 for	 the	 3N-
dimensionality	of	the	configuration	space,	on	which	the	wavefunction	is	defined.120		
By	means	of	contrast,	consider	two	alternate	proposals:	
• “Configuration	 Space	 Realism”	 regards	 the	 wavefunction	 as	 a	 real	 object	 in	
configuration	space.	It	faces	“the	Problem	of	Perception”:	If	the	fundamental	quantum	
world	 lives	 in	3N-	dimensional	configuration	space,	how	 is	 this	compatible	with	the	
world	ostensibly	unfolding	itself	in	3D	physical	space?	How	to	adjudicate	between	the	
rivalling	claims	of	reality	being	3N-dimensional	vs.	3-dimensional?		
• “Multifield	 Realism”	 tries	 to	 avoid	 the	 Problem	 of	 Perception	 by	 regarding	 both	
configuration	 space	 and	 3-space	 as	 equally	 real;	 the	 wavefunction,	 acting	 like	 an	
invisible	 hand	 on	 the	 particles	 and	 fields	 by	 guiding	 their	 dynamics,	 encodes	 a	
multitude	 of	 fields	 in	 ordinary	 3D-space.	Multifield	 Realism	 faces	 “the	 Problem	 of	







space.	 Recall,	 however,	 our	 previous	 remark	 that	 wavefunction	 realism	 only	 asserts	 the	







SdBBT	 thus	 remains	 wavefunction	 realist,	 whilst	 conceiving	 of	 the	 wavefunction	 as	 a	
(dispositional)	 property.	 Consequently,	 the	 intuition	 that	 the	 wavefunction,	 no	 longer	
understood	 as	 a	 substantial/physical	 field,	 must	 be	 defined	 on	 physical	 space	 loses	 its	
plausibility;	 the	wavefunction	represents	a	property	of	 the	N-corpuscle	universe.	Since	 the	












disposition	 to	 localise	 themselves	 stretches	 throughout	 all	 of	 space:	 The	 disposition	 is	




wavefunction	Ψ&	 ,	 representing	 the	 propensity	 of	 the	 N-corpuscle	 universe	 to	 pop	 into	
existence	with	a	certain	configuration	𝑸:= 𝑸=,… ,𝑸3 ∈ ℝ23,	 is	a	holistic	(non-separable,	
but	not	non-local)	property	of	the	whole	system.	It	doesn’t	supervene	on	the	properties	of	
each	 individual	 corpuscles.121	Rather,	 the	 propensity	ℙlÏ 𝑸¦ ∈ 𝒬 	of	 the	 i-th	 corpuscle	 to	










have	 recently	 diagnosed	 for	 primitive	 ontologies,	 with	 discrete	 beables	 whose	 temporal	
sequences	are	no	longer	continuous122	(“flash	ontologies”):	









realist	 principle	 that	 the	 accounts	 the	 various	 disciplines	 envision	 of	 their	 scrutinised	
fragments	of	reality	be	mutually	consistent,	rather	than	contradict	each	other;	the	GRW-flash	
theory,	Maudlin’s	objection	asserts,	 flouts	 this	principle:	According	 to	GRW-flash	 theory,	a	
DNA	strand	materialises	approximately	only	once	per	day,	whereas	the	DNA	model	biologists	
successfully	utilise	in	their	research	assumes	that	the	DNA	strand	persists.	
Despite	 its	 likewise	 “flashy”	 ontology,	 sdBBT	 obeys	Maudlin’s	 principle:	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	
entire	N-corpuscle	 universe	 performing	 a	 random	 jump	 through	 configuration	 space,	 the	
macroscopic	 objects	 of	 our	 stochastic	 Bohmian	 world	 are	 indeed	 composed	 of	 actual	
corpuscles.		To	be	sure,	sdBBT	radically	revises	our	picture	of	the	world,	namely	implying	that	
we	most	probably	only	exist	for	one	instant	in	the	whole	history	of	the	universe	(more	on	this	








Arguably	 a	 more	 serious	 version	 of	 the	 problem	 concerns	 measurements:	 What	 is	 a	
measurement	 device	 supposed	 to	 interact	 with,	 if	 the	 measured	 quantum	 object,	 say	 a	
trapped	electron,	only	materialises	once	in	a	blue	moon?	Esfeld	and	Gisin	write:	“Let	us	take	
for	granted	that	the	flash	ontology	can	account	for	macroscopic	objects	such	as	measuring	










the	 wavefunction	 warrants	 that	 both	 the	measurement	 system	 and	 the	 quantum	 system	
indeed	always	exist,	albeit	not	necessarily	actualiter.	 To	establish	 the	connection	between	
measurement	system	and	observed	system,	now	the	wavefunction’s	holistic	nature	comes	














the	 family	 resemblance	 between	 dBBT	 and	 sdBBT	 sanctify	 or	 do	 the	 differences	
contest	it?		












charge	 of	 the	 so-called	 Problem	of	 Preferred	 Basis.)	 By	 contrast,	 sdBBT,	 albeit	 empirically	
equivalent	 to	 standard	 QM,	 breaks	 this	 symmetry	 of	 all	 pairs	 of	 conjugated	 variables	 by	
distinguishing	position	as	the	sole	“beable”	(Bell),	 i.e.	the	dynamical	variable	that	 is	always	
value-definite/-determinate;	furthermore,	position	is	the	only	non-contextual	variable,	i.e.	in	
both	 dBBT	 and	 sdBBT	 corpuscles	 have	 no	 dynamical	 properties	 other	 than	 position.	 In	
consequence,	 Bell’s	 identification 127 	of	 sdBBT	 as	 a	 version	 of	 Everett’s	 Many	 Worlds	
Interpretation	of	QM	is	mistaken.	
This	distinction	of	position	as	a	beable	can	be	seen	to	be	motivated	physically	by	the	fact	that	
decoherence	–	 the	entanglement	of	 systems	with	 their	 ambient	environment	–	acts	as	an	
effective	 superselection	 rule,	with	position	as	a	preferred	variable,	 relatively	 stable/robust	
																																																						








under	 interference,	 and	 in	particular,	 entanglement	effects,	 and	 commuting	with	all	 other	
observables.	 Conversely,	 such	a	distinction	by	 stipulation	has	 explanatory	 surplus	 value:	 It	
supplies	 a	 clear	 primitive	 ontology	whose	merits,	 such	 as	 an	 advantage	 in	 the	 debate	 on	
scientific	realism,	have	been	extolled	elsewhere.128		




sdBBT	 is	 thus	 fully-fledged	 “deBroglie-Bohmian”,	 of	 which	 it	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 minimal	
version.130	(N.B.:	Other	theories	might	as	well	count	as	minimally	deBroglie-Bohmian	theories,	
Nelson	Stochastics	being	a	potential	candidate,	see	sect.	VI.)	More	formally,	we	stipulate	that	































(2) The	positions	 of	 these	 corpuscles	 have	beable	 status	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 e.g.	 fermion	
number	in	Bell’s	merely	Bohm-like	lattice	Quantum	Field	Theory.134	




Within	 this	 family	 of	 theories,	 sdBBT	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 ontologically	 most	 parsimonious	
member.		IV.2:	sdBBT	and	realism	










reconciled	with	a	 realistic	description	of	 reality.”136	In	 short:	 In	 giving	up	dBBT’s	 “fictitious	
determinism”,	we	needn’t	succumb	to	anti-realism.	
Note,	 however,	 as	 Fine	 points	 out,	 that	 dBBT	 compels	 us	 to	 disentangle	 the	 two	 claims	
underlying	classical	 realism137:	 firstly,	 the	metaphysical	one,	 that	 there	exists	an	observer-













While	dBBT	and	sdBBT	doubtlessly	both	embrace	 the	metaphysical	 component	of	 classical	
realism	 (“objectivism“),	 a	 measurement	 act	 in	 dBBT	 –	 itself	 a	 physical	 process	 –	 can	
occasionally	disturb	the	state	of	the	measured	system,	so	that	its	pre-measurement	state	and	
the	state	revealed	through	the	measurement	differ:	Measurements	can	be	invasive,	and	not	
merely	 passive	 records	 of	 the	 state	 of	 affairs.	 Already	 Bohm,	 in	 his	 treatment	 of	 the	 1-
dimensional	 particle	 in	 a	 box	 (see	 Sect.	 III.3)	 acknowledged	 this	 turning	 away	 from	 the	
epistemological	component	of	classical	realism:	“According	to	the	Bohmian	prescription	for	




the	wavefunction	 of	 the	measured	 system:	Measurements	 thus	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 seen	 as	
passively	reading	out	pre-existing	values.	This	is	vividly	demonstrated	by	the	Quantum	Zeno	
Effect,	where	 the	physical	 interaction	with	a	measurement	device	 inhibits	 the	decay	of	an	
unstable	 particle.	 But	 already	 thoroughly	 classical	 systems,	 once	 they	 reach	 a	 certain	
complexity,	 can	 flout	 the	 epistemological	 claim	 of	 classical	 realism,	 as	 the	 butterfly	 effect	
popularly	illustrates:	Any	tiny	perturbation	of	any	observation	qua	physical	interaction	with	
the	observational	 instruments	may	be	amplified,	 so	 that	what	 the	presence	measurement	
reveals	about	the	system’s	state	can	considerably	differ	from	the	state	in	which	the	system	
would	have	been	in	isolation,	i.e.	without	the	measurement.	(It’s	in	fact	such	an	–	in	essence	













the	 temporal	 continuity	 of	 configurations:	 Since	 the	 corpuscles	 perform	 random	 jumps	




same	 time,	 but	 one	 after	 another.”139	Indeed,	 an	 sdBBT	 universe	 typically	 keeps	 jumping	
between	even	macroscopically	distinct	configurations.	Any	minute,	thus,	a	universe	could	pop	
into	 existence	 in	 which	 dinosaurs	 aren’t	 extinct	 yet.	 Strictly	 speaking,	 each	 such	 “world”	
endures	 only	 for	 infinitesimal	 instants	 of	 time	 –	 a	 peculiarity	 Bell	 lampoons	 as	 “temporal	
solipsism”.140	Yet,	striking	our	common	sense	intuitions	as	absurd,	as	sdBBT	doubtlessly	does	
in	 this	 regard,	 bears	 little	 argumentative	weight	 –	 especially	 not	 if	 the	 theory	 is	 expressly	





• One	 source	 of	 Bell’s	 worry	 may	 be	 that	 sdBBT	 astronomically	 exacerbates	 our	
uncertainty	of	any	past	or	future	we’re	capable	to	reconstruct	or	anticipate.	Since	the	
state	 of	 the	world	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	 an	 irreducibly	 stochastic	 jump,	 it’s	 extremely	
probable	that	already	in	the	next	second	the	universe	will	visit	a	region	of	configuration	

















tight	 connection	 between	 the	 uncertainty	 about	 our	 world’s	 existence	 and	 the	
relevance	of	 information:	How	can	our	current	knowledge	be	relevant	 for	decisions	
whose	consequences	lie	in	a	future	that	might	–	with	overwhelming	probability	–	not	
happen?	 If	 we	 assume	 that	 memories	 and	 knowledge	 supervene	 on	 current	








• As	 a	 third	 reason	 to	 reject	 sdBBT,	 Bell	 accuses	 its	 temporal	 solipsism	 of	 being	
irrefutable.	We	construe	this	as	a	methodological	ramification	of	the	conjunction	of	
the	previously	claimed	unreliability	of	our	memories	and	the	doubts	regarding	their	
relevancy	 for	 future-directed	 actions:	 If	 contemporaneous	 configurations	 are	 no	
longer	 reliably	 linked	 to	 past	 configurations,	 with	 memories,	 archaeological	 and	
historical	records	being	“entirely	unreliable”144,	the	same	must	apply	to	measurements	












A	 sideway	 glance	 at	 Everett’s	 Many	Worlds	 Interpretation	 will	 prove	 rewarding:	 How	 do	
Everettians	define	worlds?	145	According	 to	Wallace,	 a	 “world”	 isn’t	 a	 fundamental,	 but	 an	
emergent	concept,	defined	only	pragmatically	as	the	components	of	the	wave	function	of	the	
universe	in	some	decomposition	into	dynamically	approximately	independent	wavepackets,	
narrowly	 localised	 in	momentum	and	position	 space,	 and	hence	approximately	 stable	 and	





In	 the	 following,	 “worlds”	will	 always	 refer	 to	 corpuscle	 configurations	 in	 such	 emergent,	
pragmatically	defined	“branches”.	
Neither	 decoherence	 nor	 the	 functionalism	 employed	 in	 the	 above	 pragmatic	 concept	 of	
world	are	committed	to	any	specific	interpretation	of	QM.	Thus,	with	impunity	we	may	also	
avail	 ourselves	of	 them	 to	 clarify	 sdBBT’s	many	worlds	 character,	which	Bell	 had	 correctly	
diagnosed:	 Whereas	 in	 Everett	 all	 such	 worlds	 exist	 simultaneously,	 in	 sdBBT,	 each	 is	




Note	 that	 on	 this	 understanding	 of	 a	 world,	 sdBBT’s	 temporal	 solipsism	 involves	 “jumps	
between	 worlds”,	 not	 merely	 jumps	 between	 (macro-)configurations	 simpliciter:	 Being	
associated	with	decoherence-induced	wavepackets,	which	one	can	track	through	time,	worlds	
display	some	form	of	diachronic	stability	(we’ll	elaborate	on	this	in	a	moment);	consequently,	

















history	 of	 that	 world.	 Since	 any	 such	 world	 behaves	 FAPP-classically,	 and	 in	 particular	 is	
causally	 FAPP-closed,	 the	 histories	 we	 reconstruct	 from	 our	 available,	 present	 knowledge	
about	the	world	will	be	causally	closed:	All	the	data	within	one	world,	 i.e.	our	perceptions,	
memories	 and	 future	anticipations,	 are	 consistent	 and	even	 coherent,	with	no	a-causal	 or	
otherwise	 absurd	 irregularities.	 In	 short,	 any	 snapshot	of	 the	history	of	 a	world	 (including	
perceptions,	memories,	etc.)	will	appear	completely	normal	–	FAPP-indistinguishable	from	a	
suitable	 snapshot	 of	 a	 classical	 world.	 	 Consequently,	 assuming	 that	 QM	 is	 empirically	
adequate,	for	all	practical	purposes	no	empirical	evidence	(including	measurement	records)	
consistent	with	QM	can	ever	contradict	sdBBT,	which,	after	all,	simply	consists	in	positing	a	
stochastic	 occurrence	 of	 such	 snapshots	 of	 world	 histories,	 allowed	 by	 the	 universal	
wavefunction.	 In	 short,	 sdBBT	 is	 capable	 of	 accounting	 for	 all	 empirical	 phenomena	 QM	
predicts.		
Whether	 a	world	 is	 actualised	 at	 other	 points	 in	 time	 or	 not,	 is	 a	 separate	 question;	 if	 a	
nanosecond	later	a	world	is	actualised	with	completely	different	historical	records,	then	simply	
a	 different	 world	 has	 jumped	 into	 existence,	 notwithstanding	 our	 linguistic	 habit	 to	 then	
indexically	refer	to	that	world,	too,	as	“ours”.	In	short,	the	reply	to	Bell’s	question:	“How	can	
a	temporal	solipsist	take	seriously	what	he	or	she	remembers	and	perceives?”	is	simply	that	–	













times	 of	 non-actuality/non-existence	 in-between?	 We’ll	 call	 this	 the	 “Problem	 of	
Persistence”.	
2. Is	data	within	one	world	–	namely	 the	one	we	happen	to	 inhabit	at	some	arbitrary	
instant	–	relevant	to	actions?	Should	we	pursue	our	duties,	dreams	and	hopes	that	






wasn’t/isn’t	 actualised,	 it	 still	 belongs	 to	 my	 world.	 (Recall	 the	 above	 stance	 on	





• More	 formally,	 let’s	 tentatively	 take	 an	 action	A	 relative	 to	 a	 certain	 goal	G	 to	 be	
relevant,	 represented	 by	 the	 holding	 of	 the	 relation	𝑟(. , . ) 	if	 and	 only	 if	 A	 is	 an	
appropriate	means	to	reach	G,	i.e.	ceteris	paribus	brings	about	the	intended	goal:	𝐺 →𝐴:	𝑟(𝐺, 𝐴) ⟺	𝐺 → 𝐴.		
This	definition	of	r	remains	silent	on	the	actuality	𝛼(𝒲)	of	the	world	𝒲	to	which	G	
belongs,	i.e.	that	𝛼(𝒲)	holds,	such	that	𝐺 ∈ 𝒲.		
Such	 reference	 is	 straightforwardly	 implemented	 by	 stipulating	 that	 an	 action	 A	
relative	 to	 goal	 G	 be	 considered	 relevant,	 i.e.	 that	 𝑟 𝐴, 𝐺 	holds,	 iff	 G	 isn’t	 an	
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appropriate	means	for	A,	i.e.	¬ 𝐺 → 𝐴 ,	only	if	the	G-containing	world	𝒲	isn’t	actual,	
either	¬𝛼(𝒲).	That	is:	𝑟 𝐺, 𝐴 ⟺ ¬ 𝐺 → 𝐴 → ¬𝛼(𝒲).	By	contraposition,	thus:	𝑟 𝐺, 𝐴 ⟺ 𝛼 𝒲 →	 𝐺 → 𝐴 .	
This	bi-conditional	remains	true,	even	if	the	world	𝒲	isn’t	actual,	¬𝛼(𝒲).	
In	conclusion,	 the	relevancy	of	an	action	relative	to	a	goal	 is	 independent	 from	the	
actuality	of	a	world	in	which	the	goal	exists.	
By	 decoupling	 the	 reliability	 of	 our	memories	 or	 future	 anticipations	 from	 the	 ontological	
Problem	of	Persistence,	Bell’s	worry	of	 sdBBT	undermining	 the	 relevancy	of	our	 actions	 is	
blocked.	
Consequently,	also	his	claim	of	sdBBT’s	irrefutability	becomes	moot	–	as	far	as	the	reliability	
of	measurements	 is	the	 issue:	They	are	 just	as	reliable	and	relevant	as	any	other	historical	
records.	
As	 far	 as	 the	 issue	 is	 irrefutability,	 it’s	 either	 trivially	 true	 –	 or	 beside	 the	 point:	Given	 its	
empirical	equivalence	with	ordinary	QM,	any	violation	of	a	quantum-mechanical	prediction	
would	 refute	 sdBBT,	 too.	 Insofar,	 however,	 that	 Bell	 criticises	 that	 a	 defence	 of	 temporal	
solipsism	can’t	resort	to	empirical	arguments,	the	objection	is	beside	the	point:	Firstly,	should	
empirical	indistinguishability	be	the	issue,	it	suffices	to	recall	that	under-determination	by	the	
empirical	 data	 is	 a	 generic	 scientific	 phenomenon150,	 for	 which	 one	 cannot	 reproach	 any	
specific	theory.	Secondly,	should	the	issue	be	the	need	for	trans-empirical	arguments,	then	to	





















It’s	 instructive	 to	 compare	 sdBBT’s	multiverse	 nature,	 rooted	 in	 its	 temporal	 solipsism,	 to	
Boltzmann	Brains	scenarios	in	SM,	the	possibility	of	worlds	randomly	jumping	into	existence,	
filled	with	memories	and	records	of	a	non-existent	past.		
Boltzmann	 Brain	 scenarios	 arise	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Boltzmann’s	 H-theoretical	 attempts	 to	
explain	the	entropy	increase,	captured	in	the	2nd	Law	of	Thermodynamics.	Not	hinging	on	a	
preferred	 direction	 of	 time,	 his	 argument	 also	 holds	 for	 time-reversal.	 (Loschmidt’s	


























argument	 as	 circular.	 Furthermore,	 he	 remarks	 that	 the	 Poincaré	 recurrence	 theorem	
presupposes	 antecedent	 conditions,	 such	 as	 finite	 phase	 space	 volume	 and	 finitely	 many	
degrees	of	freedom,	likely	not	to	be	met	for	our	universe.		
The	 second	 argument	 appeals	 to	 the	 time-reversal	 invariance	 of	 the	 underlying	 micro-
dynamics:	Since	an	 isolated	brain	of	a	sentient	observer	can	degrade	thermally	 into	a	 final	
equilibrium	heat	death,	by	time-reversal,	a	state	of	thermal	equilibrium	can	also	evolve	–	no	
matter	how	improbably	–	into	an	isolated	brain	of	a	sentient	being.	Norton	also	repudiates	
this	 argument,	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 time-reversal	 invariance	 of	 CM’s	micro-dynamics	 no	
longer	needs	to	carry	through	from	a	more	fundamental	quantum	perspective,	with	the	weak	
interaction	 (mediating	 radioactivity	 and	 hence	 arguably	 also	 biologically	 non-negligible)	






assume	 discrete	 energy	 spectra,	 a	 far	 too	 restrictive	 assumption	 for	 the	 general	 case158),	














overcomes	 the	 Initiation	 Problem	 by	 its	 fundamental	 stochasticity:	 A	 “Bohm	 Brain”,	












brains”	 (Norton),	 typically	 hallucinating	 chaotic	 worlds.	 In	 short,	 Boltzmann	 Brains	 are	
empirically	inadequate:	The	theory	would	predict	batty	memories	and	perceptions.	























between	 the	 distance	 and	 observed	 recession	 velocities	 of	 far-away	 galaxies?	 On	
common	 notions,	 phenomenological	 models	 link	 observable	 properties,	 without	
providing	any	mechanism	in	terms	of	explanations	from	fundamental	first	principles.163	
(In	 the	 case	 of	 Hubble’s	 Law,	 of	 course,	 after	 Hubble’s	 formulation	 of	 his	
phenomenological	 law,	Lemaître	succeeded	 in	deriving	 it	as	an	approximation	 from	
General	 Relativity,	 promoting	 thereby	 its	 status	 from	 phenomenological	 law	 to	
(approximate)	theorem.)	
SdBBT	sits	squarely	with	such	a	notion	of	“phenomenological”:	SdBBT	doesn’t	restrict	























2. Secondly,	we	need	 to	 address	 an	 intriguing	objection	 that	 dBBT’s	GE	 after	 all	does	
possess	explanatory	surplus	value	–	viz.	by	allowing	a	 justification	of	 the	Symmetry	
Postulate	 for	 composite	 N-corpuscle	 systems.	 An	 objection	 pulling	 in	 the	 same	








• In	 dBBT,	 by	 specifying	 initial	 corpuscle	 positions	 one	 selects	 one	 of	 the	 possible	






wavefunction,	 into	 which	 no	 trajectories	 lead,	 are	 equally	 real:	 Myriads	 of	 empty	
wavefunction	branches,	which	in	general	no	longer	affect	the	system,	thus	populate	








Of	 course,	 the	 price	 for	 this	 solution	 is	 the	 postulate	 of	 a	 disposition,	which	 by	 its	













themselves,	but	 the	 relation	between	dispositions	and	manifestations	 is	not	one	of	























axiom 169 ,	 via	 the	 topological	 approach,	 dBBT	 can	 naturally	 justify	 the	 Symmetrisation	
Postulate	 for	 identical	 particles. 170 	It	 states	 that	 wavefunctions,	Ψ(𝑸,… ,𝑸𝑵), 	of	 bosonic	
(fermionic)	 N-particle	 systems	 behave	 (anti-)symmetrically	 under	 permutations	 𝜋"¦ 	of	
particles,	 labelled	 i	 and	 j:	𝜋"¦Ψ 𝑸𝟏,… ,𝑸𝑵 = ±Ψ 𝑸𝟏,… ,𝑸𝑵 .	 Such	 an	 astonishing	 claim	
would	contradict	 the	 redundancy	of	 the	GE,	 from	which	sdBBT	draws	 its	appeal.	With	our	
grasp	of	sdBBT’s	conceptual	structure	sharpened,	we’re	now	in	a	position	to	address	the	claim.	
We	submit,	sdBBT	is	equally	able	to	motivate	the	Symmetrisation	Postulate.	
The	 technical	 details	 of	 the	 topological	 approach,	which	 turns	 on	 the	 non-trivial	 topology	
(multiple	connectedness)	of	the	reduced	configuration	space	(more	on	that	below)	shall	not	
detain	us	here;	instead,	we‘ll	focus	on	the	crucial	step,	viz.	the	removal	of	the	“coincidence	
points”	 Δ ≔ 𝑸:= 𝑸𝟏,… ,𝑸𝑵 ∈ ℝ2¹: ∃i ≠ j: 𝐐𝐢 = 𝐐𝐣 	from	 configuration	 space	 ℝ2¹ .	
Brown	 et	 al.	 claim	 dBBT	 naturally	 justifies	 this	 removal.	 Let’s	 recapitulate	 their	 chain	 of	
reasoning:	
(1) The	corpuscles	being	 identical	 (more	precisely:	 indistinguishable),	 their	 index	 labels	
possess	no	intrinsic	meaning.	Hence,	since	the	configuration	Q	of	corpuscle	positions	
completely	 specifies	 the	 actual	 state	 of	 a	 system,	 for	 a	 given	 wavefunction	Ψ ,	 a	
																																																						
168	E.g.	Timpson	(2011),	pp.	14	





permutation	𝜋 ∈ Σ¹ 	of	 indices	 shouldn’t	 alter	 the	 state	of	 the	 system:	 𝜋𝑸,Ψ 	and	𝑸,Ψ 	are	physically	equivalent.	The	redundancy	of	configuration	space	can	thus	be	
purged	 by	 transition	 to	 the	 reduced	 configuration	 space	𝔇 ≔ ℝ23/Σ¹ ,	 where	
configurations	 that	 differ	 from	 one	 another	 only	 by	 a	 permutation	 are	 identified,	
preserving	the	physical	information.		
(2) The	 GE	 being	 1st-order,	 corpuscles	 coincide	 either	 always	 or	 never:	𝔇\Δ	and	Δ	are	
invariant	under	the	action	of	the	dBBT	dynamics.	
a. This	 implies	 that,	 consistently	with	 the	dBBT	dynamics,	we	may	 remove	 the	
coincidence	points	Δ	from	reduced	configuration	space	𝔇.	
b. This	removal	“[…]	seems	physically	well	motivated,	since	they	correspond	to	
motions	 for	 which	 [the	 involved	 corpuscles]	 coincide	 for	 all	 times	 –	 which	
would	appear	as	the	motion	of	one	particle	of	M-fold	mass	and	charge.”171	
(3) The	 removal	 doesn’t	 affect	 dBBT’s	 observable/statistical	 predictions,	 for	 the	 set	 of	




















spatiotemporal	 distinctness	 constitutes	 individuality/identity	 and	 thus	 grounds	
numerical	distinctness.	In	other	words,	(2b)	assumes	that	spatiotemporal	distinctness	
is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 individuating	 two	otherwise	 indistinguishable	particles.	
And	since	the	number	of	particles	is	fixed	in	a	deBroglie-Bohmian	theory,	the	removal	
of	Δ	follows.		
However,	 in	 the	 stochastic	 world	 of	 sdBBT,	 corpuscles	 no	 longer	 have	 continuous	
spatiotemporal	paths:	They	localise/delocalise	spontaneously	at	random	points.	One	
thus	faces	two	options:	Either	one	continues	to	adhere	to	the	spatiotemporal	PI	and	
allows	 for	 multiply	 occupied	 spacetime	 points,	 thereby	 indeed	 forgoing	 the	
justification	for	removing	Δ.	Equally	well,	however,	given	that	nowhere	do	Brown	et	
al.	 explicate	 the	 above	 (PI),	 let	 alone	 argue	 for	 it,	 one	 could	 adapt	 an	 alternate	
principium	 individuationis	 (PI*),	 arguably	more	 natural	 to	 a	 discontinuous	world	 of	
corpuscle	 jumps:	 Two	 corpuscles	 are	 identical,	 if	 they	 coincide	 at	 one	 point	 in	







experimental	 contexts	 whose	 treatment	 doesn’t	 fit	 comfortably	 within	 standard	 QM,	 e.g.	
regarding	dwell	and	tunnelling	times,	escape	times	and	escape	positions,	scattering	theory	
and	quantum	chaos.173		





















each	α-th	particle	with	 initial	 position	𝑄(ä) 	reach	a	 given	point	Q	 at	 time	𝑡(ä).	 (In	 general,	
solutions	of	the	GE,	𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑡; 𝑄ä ),	won’t	be	invertible	in	closed	form.)	For	the	corpuscle	with	




Δ𝑡ÃÄ = d𝑄ä 𝜓(𝑄ä ) 9Δ𝑡(𝑄Ã, 𝑄Ä; 𝑄ä )å .	
The	deterministic	trajectories	play	a	crucial	heuristic	role	here,	suggesting	an	intuitive	way	to	
















frequent	 criticism	 of	 dBBT	 –	 namely	 the	 (still	 largely	 unresolved)	 issue	 of	 its	 relativistic	
generalisation.	The	 locus	of	 those	problems	with	a	 relativistic	dBBT,	we’ll	 presently	argue,	
again	lies	in	the	GE.	Dispensing	with	the	latter	thus	makes	sdBBT	an	attractive	alternative	to	
dBBT:	We	 submit	 that	 sdBBT,	 indeed,	 is	 free	 from	 non-locality,	 i.e.	 a	 spooky	 action-at-a-
distance,	but	exhibits	non-separability.	
Let’s	 briefly	 recall	 the	 situation	 in	 ordinary	 QM	 with	 the	 collapse	 postulate	 and	 its	
relativisation.	There,	the	following	quandary	looms176:	Either	the	collapse	is	instantaneous	(as	
standard	formulations	seem	to	suggest)	–	highly	problematic	for	SR,	as	superluminal	signal	
transfer	 arguably	 gives	 rise	 to	 paradoxes,	 involving	 causal	 loops.	 Furthermore,	 the	
instantaneous	propagation	of	an	effect	privileges	a	 reference	 frame	–	 in	 conflict	with	SR’s	
Principle	 of	 Relativity,	 which	 postulates	 the	 equivalence	 of	 all	 reference	 frames 177 ;	
alternatively,	contemporary	QM	needs	to	be	modified	ad-hoc	so	as	to	suitable	account	for	a	
collapse	mechanism.	Either	choice	seems	hard	to	swallow.		
By	 denying	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 collapse,	 non-collapse	 theories,	 such	 as	 dBBT,	 avoid	 this	














Associated	with	 the	Klein-Gordon	Equation	 for	 the	complex	 scalar	 function	𝜙,	describing	a	
spin	0-particle	of	mass	m	and	charge	q	in	the	external	electromagnetic	potential	𝐴¡,	𝑚9 + 𝜕¡ + 𝑖𝑞𝐴¡ 𝜕¡ + 𝑖𝑞𝐴¡ 𝜙 𝑸, 𝑡 = 0,	




time-like,	𝑗¡𝑗¡ > 0.	 In	 the	 general	 case,	 though,	 such	 a	 proposal	 isn’t	 viable	 for	 two	main	
reasons	178:	Firstly,	𝑗	is	of	indefinite-sign,	not	even	for	free	solutions	of	positive	energy	states,	
and	 hence	 defies	 a	 particle	 or	 probability	 density.	 Secondly,	𝑗¡ 	generically	 isn’t	 time-like.	




ground,	 for	 the	 Klein-Gordon	 Theory	 doesn’t	 admit	 of	 a	 satisfactory	 single-particle	
interpretation	 to	 begin	 with.	 (Besides	 of	 some	 formal	 difficulties	 with	 suitable	 position	
operators	and	 localizability	 in	 relativistic	QM,	 in	general,	Holland	 reminds	 the	 reader	 that,	
unless	supplemented	by	further	ad-hoc	constraints,	Lorentz-covariant	wave	equations,	such	
as	 the	 Klein-Gordon	 Equation,	 are	 well-known	 to	 exhibit	 superluminal	 transmission	 and	
backwards-causation	 –	 both	 consequences	 highly	 problematic	 in	 their	 own	 right,	 if	 not	
downright	paradoxical.)	






180	More	satisfactory	 field-based	bosonic	 theories	exist,	 cf.	e.g.	Dürr	et	al.	 (2004);	Nikolic	 (2005).	But	 they	go	
beyond	our	current	scope	–	in	two	regards:	Firstly,	in	that	we	are	focussing	on	deBroglie-Bohmian	approaches,	
narrowly	construed	as	primitive	ontologies	based	on	particles/corpuscles	with	position	as	beable;	secondly,	we	




How	 does	 the	 situation	 look	 for	 fermions?	 Here,	 we’ll	 argue,	 sdBBT	 will	 unbosom	 its	




Dirac	Equation	(for	ease	of	notation,	ℏ = 𝑐 = 1)	for	each	particle	𝑘 ∈ ℕê3:	
𝑖𝛾U𝜕& + 𝑖𝛾U" 𝜕" + 𝑒𝛾U" 𝐴" 𝑸U, 𝑡 − 𝑒𝛾UΦ 𝑸U, 𝑡 − 𝑚3¦<="<=,9,2 𝜓 𝑸, 𝑡 = 0	
Here,	the	𝛾U¡denotes	the	𝜇-th	Dirac	matrix,	acting	on	the	k-th	particle	(in	the	following,	we’ll	
use	 the	 following	 conventions:	𝜸U ≔ 𝛾U" "<=,9,2 	and	𝛾 =⊗U<=3 𝛾U 	),	m	 and	 e	 denote	 the	
mass	and	the	charge	of	the	Dirac	particles,	respectively,	𝜓:	ℝ23×ℝ → ℂí ⨂3	the	N-particle	
spinor	and	𝐴¡ = Φ,𝐀 	the	electromagnetic	potentials	of	the	external	field.		
The	probability	4-current	for	each	particle	k,	𝑗U¡ = 𝜌U, 𝒋U = 𝜓𝛾𝜓, 𝜓 ⊗¦<=U[= 𝛾¦⨂𝜸U⨂⊗¦<U[=3 𝛾¦𝜓 𝑸,& ,	
with	the	adjoint	spinor	𝜓 = 𝜓£𝛾,	is	conserved,	𝜕¡𝑗¡ = 0.	 In	complete	analogy	to	the	non-
relativistic	GE,	we	obtain	the	relativistic	GE	(rGE)	for	the	k-th	corpuscle	from	the	temporal	and	
spatial	components	of	the	4-current:	
𝑑𝑸U𝑑𝑡 = 𝒋U𝜌U 𝑸,& = 𝜓⊗¦<=U[= 𝛾¦⨂𝜸U⨂⊗¦<U[=3 𝛾¦𝜓𝜓𝛾𝜓 (𝑸,&)	





It’s	 Lorentz	 invariant:	 Due	 to	 the	 physical	 insignificance	 of	 re-scaling	 the	 time	
parameterisation,	 one	 obtains,	 for	 some	 parametrisation	 s	 of	 the	 particle’s	 worldline,	 a	
manifestly	covariant	and	geometric	reformulation:	𝑑𝑄¡𝑑𝑠 ∥ 𝜓𝛾¡𝜓.	
The	complicacies	surge	in	the	many-particles	case,	𝑁 > 1.	Then,	the	rGE,	by	using	a	common	





reference	 frame	 violates	 SR’s	 Principle	 of	 Relativity,	which	 declares	 the	 equivalence	 of	 all	
reference	frames.	In	short:	While	the	statistical	predictions	coincide	with	those	of	standard	
Dirac	theory,	on	the	level	of	the	individual	particles	SR	is	violated.		
One	 might	 try	 to	 dodge	 the	 absolute	 simultaneity	 by	 moving	 to	 a	 multi-time	
wavefunction	𝜓(𝑸=, 𝑡=; …𝑸3, 𝑡3)	on	 ℝ2×ℝ ⨂3 ,	 which	 assigns	 each	 particle	 a	 time	 of	 its	
own	and	satisfies	the	multi-time	Dirac	Equation:	𝑖𝛾U¡ 𝜕¡,U9 − 𝑖𝑒𝐴¡ − 𝑚 𝜓 = 0.	
And	indeed,	the	rGE,	constructed	via	the	above	scheme	from	the	4-current,	turns	out	to	be	
Lorentz	 invariant	 for	 factorisable	 states,	 i.e.	 multi-time	 wavefunctions	 of	 the	 form	𝜓 𝑸=, 𝑡=; …𝑸3, 𝑡3 = 𝜑U(𝑡U, 𝑸U)3U<= .		
What	about	entangled/non-factorisable	states?	The	resulting	4-current	of	the	k-th	particle,	𝑗U¡ 𝑸=, 𝑡=; …𝑸3, 𝑡3 = 𝜓⊗¦<=U[= 𝛾¦⨂𝛾U¡⨂⊗¦<U[=3 𝛾¦𝜓 𝑸Ê,&Ê;…𝑸ó,&ó 	then	 likewise	 is	 no	
longer	separable.	For	a	viable	GE,	we	thus	need	to	connect	the	velocity	of	the	k-th	particle	










manifestly	covariant	rGE:		 𝑑𝑄U¡𝑑𝑠 = 𝑗U¡ 𝐐(ù).	
But	how	to	construct	the	preferred	reference	frame?	Which	vector	field	𝜂¡	to	take?	Lest	the	
thus	attained	Lorentz	covariance	be	hazarded,	𝜂¡	must	be	built	via	a	Lorentz	invariant	law.	A	
popular	proposal	is	to	choose	the	rest	frame	of	the	total	energy-momentum	of	the	universe,	𝑃¡ = 𝑑𝜎ø(𝑥) Ψ 𝑡¡ø Ψû ,	 with	 the	 wavefunction	 of	 the	 universe	Ψ ,	 the	 total	 energy-
momentum	tensor	𝑡¡ø	in	the	Heisenberg	picture	and	𝑆	an	arbitrary	space-like	hypersurface.	
(Due	to	the	conservation	of	energy-momentum	and	Stoke’s	Theorem,	𝑃¡	doesn’t	depend	on	
S.)	The	preferred	vector	field	then	is	𝜂¡ ≔ ýþýþ .	
Have	we	thus	finally	achieved	a	satisfactorily	relativistic	dBBT?	Although	Lorentz	covariance	
has	been	restored,	the	model	still	lacks	what	Bell	calls	“serious	Lorentz	invariance”:	It	needs	
to	 postulate	 extra	 structure	 in	 spacetime	 –	 an	 addition	 SR	 per	 se	 doesn’t	 warrant.	











awkwardness	 of	 an	 ad-hoc	modification	 of	 some	 principles	 of	 QM	 so	 as	 to	 incorporate	 a	
collapse.	But	isn’t	the	spontaneous	manifestation	of	a	corpuscle	configuration	tantamount	to	
form	of	instantaneous	collapse?	This	is	mistaken:	The	dispositional	wavefunction	continues	to	
evolve	 unitarily	 according	 to	 the	 Schrödinger	 dynamic,	 even	 after	 a	 manifestation.	 The	
(absence	 of	 a)	 manifestation	 of	 a	 disposition	 has	 no	 bearing	 on	 the	 disposition	 and	 its	
evolution	as	such.		
As	compared	to	dBBT,	with	the	abolition	of	a	GE,	the	need	for	preferred	reference	frames	or	
extra	 structure	 lapses	–	and	 thereby	dBBT’s	obstacle	 for	 “serious	 Lorentz	 covariance”.	But	
what	 about	 an	 action-at-a-distance,	 stemming	 from	 QM’s	 allegedly	 inherent	 non-locality,	
which,	as	Bell	argued,	originates	in	the	fact	“(t)hat	the	[wavefunction]	[…]	propagates	not	in	
ordinary	three-space,	but	in	a	multidimensional	configuration	space[…]”?184	Indeed,	actions-
at-a-distance	 would	 threaten	 the	 compatibility	 with	 SR	 in	 a	 manner	 resembling	 what	 we	





by	 classical	 relativistic	 intuitions,	 we	 take	 to	 reside	 in	 their	 joint	 past),	 we	 expect	 the	
probability	distributions	 for	 the	measurement	outcomes	 to	be	 independent	and	no	 longer	
display	 any	 correlations.”185 	Formally,	 with	𝜆 	denoting	 all	 relevant	 causal	 factors,	 i.e.	 the	
common	causes	in	the	overlap	of	the	past	cones	of	the	measurement	events,	the	probability	
distribution	 𝕡𝒂/𝒃 ,	 expressing	 the	 correlations	 between	 the	 measurement	 outcomes,	









assume	 something	 like	 Reichenbach’s	 principle	 of	 the	 common	 cause;	 namely	 that	 if	
correlations	are	not	due	to	a	direct	causal	link	between	two	events,	then	they	must	be	due	to	
common	causes,	such	causes	having	been	identified	when	conditionalization	of	the	probability	





Principle	 of	 Common	 Cause	 (whose	 scope	 of	 validity	 remains	 contented	 on	 independent	
grounds,	also	in	classical	physics187).	Recall	from	our	discussion	of	Humphreys’	Paradox	that	
we	embraced	from	the	outset	sdBBT’s	stochastic,	a-causal	nature.	
This	a-causality	 is	 rooted	 in	 sdBBT’s	 temporal	 solipsism,	 i.e.	 the	absence	of	any	diachronic	
identity	of	corpuscles.	It	defies	both	sdBBT’s	locality	and	non-locality.	Not	persisting	beyond	
an	 infinitesimal	 instant	 of	 time,	 corpuscles	 can	 neither	 themselves	 traverse	 arbitrary	






















merely	 heuristic	 fecundity)	 to	 impose	 the	 a	 priori	 demand	 all	 correlations	 require	
explanation.189	Fine	offers	a	helpful	analogy:	“[Such	a	demand]	is	like	the	ideal	that	was	passed	
on	 in	 the	 dynamical	 tradition	 from	 Aristotle	 to	 Newton,	 that	 motion	 as	 such	 requires	
explanation.”190		
It	deserves	to	be	mentioned	how	sdBBT	escapes	Einstein’s	transcendental	criticism	of	non-
separability. 191 	Distinguishing	 meticulously	 between	 non-separability	 and	 non-locality,	 he	






beables.	 Secondly,	 the	 actual	 configurations	 of	 one	 subsystem	exist	 indeed	 independently	
from	 those	of	 a	 remote	 subsystem:	 The	 actual,	 local	 configurations	 completely	 define	 the	
actual	 state	 of	 each	 subsystem;	 nonetheless,	 there	 exist	 correlations	 between	 them	 that	
betoken	the	non-separable	disposition	of	the	joint	system.	















turns	 into	 the	 congealed	 facticity	 of	 the	 past.	 By	 introducing	 such	 an	 ontologically	
distinguished	hypersurface	that	defines	the	present,	this	(“Growing	Block	Universe”)	view	has	









relativistic	 analogues	 to	 the	 Born	 Rule,	 relative	 to	 an	 observer.	 Such	 a	 view	 is	 effortlessly	
compatible	with	a	Block	Universe	View,	and	might	aptly	be	called	a	Dust	Universe	View.	(A	
perhaps	helpful	paraphrase	is	that	in	the	Dust	Universe	View,	the	4-dimensional	spacetime	
isn’t	pervaded	by	continuous	particle	 trajectories;	 rather,	 the	“dust	of	events”	 is	 randomly	
distributed.)	
In	summary,	we	have	seen	that	-within	the	framework	(and	confines)	of	relativistic	QM-	sdBBT	
suggests	 considerable	 advantages	 over	 dBBT;	 a	 comparative	 evaluation	 of	 quantum	 field	
theoretic	extensions	of	both	therefore	seems	promising.196	V.	Summary	and	outlook	
We	started	our	investigation	with	examining	the	conceptual	tension	between	ambitions	for	
an	 inveterately	 objectivist	 “quantum	 theory	 without	 observers”,	 the	 probabilistic	 QEH,	











formal	 definability,	 uniqueness,	 the	 violation	 of	 the	 Action	 Reaction	 Principle	 and	 the	
contrived-looking	 double	 role	 of	 the	 wavefunction.	 Fortunately,	 the	 GE	 turned	 out	 to	 be	
redundant:	 All	 explanatory	 work	 w.r.t.	 solving	 the	 Measurement	 Problem,	 empirical	
equivalence	with	QM	or	the	natural	justification	of	the	Symmetrisation	Postulate,	is	done	by	
dBBT’s	 particle	 primitive	 ontology	 with	 position	 as	 beables	 and	 contextuality	 of	 all	 other	
dynamical	variables.	This	suggested	to	excise	the	GE,	whilst	keeping	dBBT’s	aforementioned	
ontological	 framework,	 yielding	 a	 realist,	 albeit	 fundamentally	 stochastic/indeterministic	











deBroglie-Bohmian	 –	 namely	 Nelson	 Stochastics,	 which	 aims	 to	 derive	 the	
wavefunction	 and	 its	 Schrödinger	 dynamics	 from	 a	 classical	 Wiener-process	 in	




QM? 198 	Of	 special	 interest	 is	 a	 comparison	 with	 “Schrödinger’s	 Many	 Worlds	









primitive	 ontology”	 (Allori	 et	 al.).	 It	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 Everettian	 many	 worlds	
counterpart	to	sdBBT,	in	which	temporal	solipsism	is	overcome.	
• Perhaps	even	more	alluring	will	be	the	comparison	with	proposals	from	the	rivalling	








We	 owe	 thanks	 to	 Harvey	 Brown	 (Oxford,	 UK),	 Michael	 Esfeld	 (Lausanne,	 CH),	 Dustin	
Lazarovici	 (Lausanne,	CH),	Niels	Linnemann	 (Geneva,	CH),	Vera	Matarese	 (HKU,	HK),	Oliver	
Pooley	(Oxford,	UK),	James	Read	(Oxford,	UK),	Thomas	Møller-Nielsen	(Oxford,	UK),	Darrell	
Rowbottom	(Lingnan,	HK)	Simon	Saunders	(Oxford,	UK)	and	Jiji	Zhang	(Lingnan,	HK)	for	helpful	
discussions	and	feedback	on	earlier	versions	of	the	manuscript.	
Patrick	Duerr	gratefully	acknowledges	the	generous	financial	support	of	the	British	Society	for	
the	Philosophy	of	Science.	
Alexander	Ehmann	gratefully	acknowledges	the	generous	financial	support	of	the	Research	
Grants	Council	through	the	Hong	Kong	PhD	Fellowship	Scheme.	Bibliography	
Albert,	D.	(1992):	“Quantum	Mechanics	and	Experience”,	Harvard	University	Press	
Allori,	V.	et	al.	(2007):	“On	the	common	structure	of	Bohmian	Mechanics	and	the	Ghirardi-
Rimini-Theory”,	https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0603027		
Allori,	V.	(2013):	“On	the	Metaphysics	of	Quantum	Mechanics”,	http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9343	
Allori,	V.	(2013):	“Primitive	Ontology	and	the	Structure	of	Fundamental	Physical	Theories”,	
in:	D.	Albert/A.	Ney	(eds.),	“The	Wave	Function:	Essays	in	the	Metaphysics	of	Quantum	
Mechanics”,	Oxford	University	Press	(2013)	
	72	
	
Allori,	V.	et	al.	(2014):	“Many	Worlds	and	Schrödinger’s	First	Quantum	Theory”,	
arXiv:0903.2211v2	[quant-ph]	
Allori,	V.	(2015):	“Primitive	Ontology	in	a	Nutshell”,	International	Journal	of	Quantum	
Foundations	1	(3):	107-122	(2015)	
Allori,	V.	(2016):	“How	to	make	Sense	of	Quantum	Mechanics	(and	More):	Fundamental	
Physical	Theories	and	Primitive	Ontology”,	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11652	
Arntzenius,	F.:	“Reichenbach’s	Common	Cause	Principle”,	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	
Philosophy,	https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-Rpcc/		
Bacciagaluppi,	G.	(2005):	“A	conceptual	Introduction	to	Nelson’s	Mechanics”,	http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8853		
Beisbart,	C.	(2011):	“Probabilities	in	Physics”,	in:	Beisbart,	C./Hartmann,	S.	(eds.)	(2011):	
„Probabilities	in	Physics”,	Oxford	University	Press		
Bell,	J.S.	(1980):	“deBroglie-Bohm	delayed-choice,	double-slit	experiment”,	in:	Int.	J.	
Quantum	Chem.Symp.	14	(1980)		
Bell,	J.S.	(1982):	“About	the	impossible	pilot	wave”,	in:	J.S.	Bell:	“Speakable	and	Unspeakable	
in	Quantum	Mechanics”,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1987	
Bell,	J.S.	(1984):	“Beables	for	Quantum	Field	Theory”,	in:	J.S.	Bell:	“Speakable	and	
Unspeakable	in	Quantum	Mechanics”,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1987		
Bell,	J.S.	(1987):	“Quantum	Mechanics	for	Cosmologists”,	in:	Bell,	J.S.	(1987):	“Speakable	and	
Unspeakable	in	Quantum	Mechanics”,	Cambridge	University	Press	
Berndl,	K.	et	al.	(1995):	“On	the	global	Existence	of	Bohmian	Mechanics”,	
http://xxx.lanl.gov/pdf/quant-ph/9503013		
Berndl,	K.	et	al.:	“EPR-Bell	Nonlocality,	Lorentz	Invariance,	and	Bohmian	Quantum	Theory”,	
arXiv:quant-ph/9510027v1	
Bhogal,	H./Perry,	Z.J.	(2015)	“What	the	Humean	should	say	about	Entanglement”,	Noûs,	DOI	
10.1111/nous.12095		
Brown,	H.R.	et	al.	(1995):	“Bohm	Particles	and	Their	Detection	in	the	Light	of	Neutron	
Interferometry”,	in:	Found.Phys.	25,	2,	1995	
Brown,	H.,	R./Anandan,	J.	(1995):	“On	the	reality	of	space-time	geometry	and	the	
wavefunction”,	Found.Phys.	25	(2):	349-60	(1995)	
Brown,	H.	R.	et	al.	(1998):	“Remarks	on	Identical	Particles	in	deBroglie-Bohm	Theory”,	
arXiv:quant-ph/9811054v1	
Brown,	H.R./Wallace,	D.	(2004):	“Solving	the	Measurement	Problem:	deBroglie-Bohm	loses	
out	on	Everett”,	arXiv:quant-ph/0403094v1	
Brown,	H.R.	(2007):	“Dynamical	Relativity”,	Oxford	University	Press	
	73	
	
Brown,	H.R.	(2009):	“Comment	on	Valentini”,	arXiv:0901.1278v1	
Brown,	H.R.	(2011):	“Curious	and	the	sublime:	The	connection	between	uncertainty	and	
probability	in	physics”,	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8571	
Brown,	H.R./Lehmkuhl,	D.	(2013):	“Einstein,	the	reality	of	space	and	the	action-reaction	
principle”,	arXiv:1306.4902v1	
Bunge,	M.	(1967):	“Foundations	of	Physics”,	Springer	
Bunge,	M.	(1974):	“Treatise	on	Basic	Philosophy:	Vol.	I,	Semantics:	Sense	and	Reference	&	
Interpretation	and	Truth”,	Springer	
Bunge,	M.	(1981):	“Scientific	Materialism”,	Springer	
Bunge,	M.	(1997):	“Mechanism	and	Explanation”,	in:	Philos.Soc.Sci. 27	(4):410-465	(1997)	
Bunge,	M.	(2011):	“Tratado	de	filosofía.	Vol.	III,	Ontología	1:	El	moblaje	del	mundo“,	Gedisa	
Callender,	C./Weingard	(1997):	“Trouble	in	Paradise?	Problems	for	Bohm's	Theory”,	Monist,	
1997,	80,	1,	24-43	
Callender,	C.	(n.d.):	“Discussion:	The	Redundancy	Argument	against	Bohm’s	Theory”,	
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/ccallender/The%20Redundancy%20Argument%20
Against%20Bohmian%20Mechanics.doc		
Callender,	C.	(2007):	“The	Emergence	and	interpretation	of	probability	in	Bohmian	
Mechanics”,	Stud.Hist.Phil.Mod.Phys.	38	(2007),	351-370	
Callender,	C.	(2015):	“One	world,	one	beable”,	Synthese	(2015)	192:	3153	
Chiao,	R.	(1998):	“Tunnelling	Times	and	Superluminality”,	arXiv:quant-ph/9811019v1	
Choi,	S./Fara,	M.	(2012):	“Dispositions”,	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/		
Collins,	R.	(1996):	“An	Epistemological	Critique	of	Bohmian	Mechanics”,	in:	J.T.	Cushing	et	al.	
(eds.):	“Bohmian	Mechanics	and	Quantum	Theory:	An	Appraisal”,	Springer,	1996	
Daumer,	M.	et	al.	(1997):	“Naïve	Realism	about	Operators”,	arXiv:quant-ph/9601013v1	
Deotto,	E./Ghirardi,	G.C.	(2002):	“Bohmian	Mechanics	Revisited”,	arXiv:quant-ph/9704021v5	
Dewar,	N.	(2016):	“La	Bohume”,	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12471/		
Dürr,	D.,	et	al.	(1995):	“Bohmian	Mechanics	and	Quantum	Equilibrium”,	
https://www.ge.infn.it/~zanghi/BMQE.pdf		
Dürr,	D.	et	al.	(2003):	“Quantum	Equilibrium	and	the	Origin	of	Absolute	Uncertainty”,	
arXiv:quant-ph/0308039v1	
Dürr,	D.	et	al.	(2004):	“Bohmian	Mechanics	and	Quantum	Field	Theory”,	arXiv:quant-
ph/0303156v2	
	74	
	
Dürr,	D./Teufel,	S.	(2008):	“Bohmian	Mechanics“,	Springer	
Dürr,	D.	et	al.	(2009):	“Hypersurface	Bohm-Dirac	Theory“,	in:	D.	Dürr	et	al.	(eds.):	“Quantum	
Theory	without	Quantum	Philosophy”,	Springer,	2013	
Dickson,	M.	(1998):	“Quantum	Chance	and	Nonlocality”,	Cambridge	University	Press	
Dorato,	M./Esfeld,	M.	(2009):	“GRW	as	an	ontology	of	dispositions”,	http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/4870/		
Eagle,	A.	(2004):	“Twenty-one	Arguments	against	Propensity	Analyses	of	Probability”,	
Erkenntnis,	60(3),	371–416	
Einstein,	A.	(1949):	“Autobiographical	Notes”,	in	P.	Schilpp:	“Albert	Einstein:	Philosopher-
Scientist“,	Open	Court,	1949	
Ellis,	G.	(2014):	“Does	the	multiverse	really	exist?”,	in:	Scientific	American,	July,	2011	
Englert,	B.	(2001):	“Rezension:	Bohmsche	Mechanik	als	Grundlage	der	Quantenmechanik”,	
http://www.pro-
physik.de/details/rezension/1109271/Bohmsche_Mechanik_als_Grundlage_der_Quantenm
echanik.html		
Esfeld,	M.	(2008):	“Die	Metaphysik	dispositionaler	Eigenschaften”,	
https://www.unil.ch/files/live/sites/philo/files/shared/DocsPerso/EsfeldMichael/2008/Dispo
-ZphF08-3.pdf	
Esfeld,	M.	(2014):	“The	Primitive	Ontology	of	Quantum	Physics	–	Guideline	for	an	
Assessment	of	the	Proposals”,	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10711/		
Esfeld,	M.	et	al.	(2014a)	“The	Ontology	of	Bohmian	Mechanics”,	
http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.1371		
Esfeld,	M.	(2014b):	“Quantum	humeanism,	or:	physicalism	without	properties”,	
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10568/		
Esfeld,	M./Gisin,	N.	(2014):	“The	GRW	flash	theory:	A	relativistic	quantum	ontology	of	matter	
in	spacetime?”,	Phil.Sci.	81	(2014),	pp.	248–264	
Esfeld,	M.	et	al.	(2015):	“The	Physics	and	Metaphysics	of	Primitive	Stuff”,	in:	Brit.J.Phil.Sci.	0	
(2015),	1-29	
Esfeld,	M.	(2016):	“Collapse	or	no	collapse?	What	is	the	best	ontology	of	quantum	mechanics	
in	the	primitive	ontology	framework?”,	https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.09218		
Fine,	A.	(1989):	"Do	correlations	Need	to	be	explained?",	in:	J.T.	Cushing/McMullin,	E.	(eds.):	
"Philosophical	Consequences	of	Quantum	Theory",	University	of	Notre	Dame	Press,	1989	
Fine,	A.	(1996):	“On	the	interpretation	of	Bohmian	Mechanics”,	in:	J.T.	Cushing	et	al.	(eds.):	
“Bohmian	Mechanics	and	Quantum	Theory:	An	Appraisal”,	Springer,	1996	
	75	
	
Frigg,	R.	(2007):	“Chance	in	Boltzmannian	Statistical	Mechanics”,	in:	G.	Ernst/A.	Hüttemann	
(eds.):	Time,	Chance	and	Reduction.	Philosophical	Aspects	of	Statistical	Mechanics.	
Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010	
Frigg,	R.	(2008):	“A	Field	Guide	to	Recent	Work	on	the	Foundations	of	Statistical	Mechanics”	
in:	Rickles,	D.	(2008)(ed.)	“Ashgate	Companion	to	Contemporary	Philosophy	of	Physics”,	
Ashgate	
Frigg,	R./Hoefer,	C.	(2008):	“Probability	in	GRW”,	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11216/		
Frigg,	R.	(2010):	“Why	typicality	does	not	explain	the	approach	to	equilibrium”,	in:	M.	Suárez	
(ed.):	“Probabilities,	Causes	and	Propensities	in	Physics”,	Springer,	2010	
Frigg,	R.	(2014):	“Chance	and	Determinism”,	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11219	
Frigg,	R./Hoefer,	C.	(2015):	“The	Best	Humean	System	for	Statistical	Mechanics”,	in:	Erkenn	
(2015)	80:	551-574	
Galavotti,	M.C.	(2001):	“What	interpretation	of	probability	in	physis”,	in:	Bricmont,	J.	et	al.	
(eds.):	“Chance	in	Physics:	Foundations	and	Perspectives”,	Springer,	2001	
Georgii,	H.-O.	(2009):	“Stochastik”,	deGruyter	
Gillies,	D.	(2000):	“Philosophical	Theories	of	Probability”,	Routledge	
Goldstein,	S.	(2001):	“Boltzmann’s	Approach	to	Statistical	Mechanics”,	
http://arxiv.org/abs/condmat/0105242		
Goldstein,	S.	et	al.	(2009):	“Bohmian	trajectories	as	a	foundation	of	Quantum	Mechanics”,	
arXiv:0912.2666v1	
Goldstein,	S.	(2011):	“Typicality	and	notions	of	probability	in	physics”,	in:	Y.	Ben-Menahem,	
M.	Hemmo	(eds.):	“Probability	in	Physics”,	Springer	
Goldstein,	S.	(2013):	“Bohmian	Mechanics”,	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy:	
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/		
Goldstein,	S./Struyve,	W.	(2007):	“On	the	Uniqueness	of	Quantum	Equilibrium	in	Bohmian	
Mechanics”,	https://arxiv.org/abs/0704.3070		
Goldstein,	S./Zanghí,	N.	(2013):	“Reality	and	the	Role	of	the	Wave	Function	in	Quantum	
Theory”	in:	A.	Ney/D.	Albert	(eds.):	“The	Wavefunction”,	Oxford	University	Press,	2013	
Hájek,	A.	(2011):	“Interpretations	of	Probability”,	in:	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/		
Hájek,	A./Hoefer,	C.	(2006):	“Chance”,	in:	D.	Borchert	(ed.):	“Macmillan’s	Encyclopedia	of	
Philosophy”,	Macmillan	Publishers,	2006	
Hemmo,	M./Shenker,	O.	(2015):	“Probability	and	Typicality	in	Deterministic	Physics”,	Erkenn	
(2015)	80	(Suppl	3):	575	
	76	
	
Hoefer,	C.	(2011):	“Physics	and	the	Humean	Approach	to	Probability”,	in:	C.	Beisbart/S.	
Hartmann	(eds.):	“Probabilities	in	Physics”,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011	
Holland,	P.	(1993):	“The	Quantum	Theory	of	Motion”,	Cambridge	University	Press	
Holland,	P./Philippidis,	C.	(2003):	“Implications	of	Lorentz	covariance	for	the	guidance	
equation	in	two-slit	quantum	interference”,	http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0302076		
Howard,	D.	(1985):	“Einstein	on	Locality	and	Separability”,	Stud.Phil.Hist.Sci.	16,	171-201	
Howard,	D.	(1989):	“Holism,	Separability,	and	the	Metaphysical	Implications	of	the	Bell	
Experiments”,	in:	J.T.	Cushing/E.McMullin	(eds.):	“Philosophical	Consequences	of	Quantum	
Theory”,	University	of	Notre	Dame	Press,	1989	
Kant,	I.	(1781):	“Kritik	der	Reinen	Vernunft”,	http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/kritik-der-
reinen-vernunft-2-auflage-3502/1		
Kuhlmann,	M.	(2010):	“The	Ultimate	Constituents	of	the	Material	World:	In	Search	of	an	
Ontology	for	Fundamental	Physics”,	Ontos	
Landauer,	R./Martin,	T.	(1994):	"Barrier	Interaction	Time	in	Tunneling",	RMP	66	(1994),	217-
228	
Lavis,	D.A.	(2011):	“An	objectivist	account	of	probabilities	in	Statistical	Mechanics”,	in:	C.	
Beisbart/S.	Hartmann	(eds.):	“Probabilities	in	Physics”,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011	
Lazarovich,	D./Reichert,	P.	(2015):	“Typicality,	Irreversibility	and	the	Status	of	Macroscopic	
Laws”,	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10895/		
Matzikin,	A./Nurock,	N.	(2003):	“Are	Bohmian	trajectories	real?”,	
http://arxiv.org/abs/quantph/0609172		
Maudlin,	T.	(1995):	“Three	Measurement	Problems”,	Topoi	14	(1):	7-15)	
Maudlin,	T.	(1996):	“Space-time	in	the	quantum	world”,	in:	J.T.	Cushing	et	al.	(eds.):	
“Bohmian	Mechanics	and	Quantum	Theory:	An	Appraisal”,	Springer,	1996	
Maudlin,	T.	(2007):	“The	Metaphysics	within	Physics”,	Oxford	University	Press	
Maudlin,	T.	(2011a):	“Three	Roads	to	Objective	Probability”,	in	C.	Beisbart/S.	Hartmann	
(eds.):	“Probabilities	in	Physics”,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011	
Maudlin,	T.	(2011b):	“Quantum	Non-Locality	and	Relativity:	Metaphysical	Intimations	of	
Modern	Physics”,	Wiley-Blackwell	
Miller,	E.	(2014):	“Quantum	Entanglement,	Bohmian	Mechanics	and	Humean	
Supervenience”,	in:	Australas.	J.	Phil.	92	(3):	567-583	(2014)	
Mumford,	S.	(2003):	“Dispositions”,	Oxford	University	Pres	
Myrvold,	W.	(2003):	“On	some	early	objections	to	Bohm’s	Theory”,	Int.Stud.Phil.Sci.	17,1,	
2003	
	77	
	
Myrvold,	W.	(2014):	“Probabilities	in	Statistical	Mechanics”,	http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/11019/		
Nikolic,	H.	(2005):	“Covariant	many-fingered	time	Bohmian	interpretation	of	Quantum	Field	
Theory”,	Phys.Lett.	A348:166-171,2006		
Norton,	J.	(2015):	“You	are	not	a	Boltzmann	Brain”,	
http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/Goodies/Boltzmann_Brain/Boltzmann_Brain.html		
Oldofredi,	A.	et	al.	“From	the	universe	to	subsystems:	Why	quantum	mechanics	appears	
more	stochastic	than	classical	mechanics”,	http://arxiv.org/abs/1604.00987		
Passon,	O.	(2005):	“Why	isn’t	every	physicist	a	Bohmian”,	arXiv:quant-ph/0412119v2	
Passon,	O.	(2006):	“What	you	always	wanted	to	know	about	Bohmian	Mechanics	but	were	
afraid	to	ask”,	http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0611032		
Passon,	O.	(2010):	“Einführung	in	die	Bohmsche	Mechanik”,	Harri	Deutsch	Verlag	
Petkov,	V.	(2009):	“Relativity	and	the	Nature	of	Spacetime“,	Springer	
Popper,	K.R.	(1982):	“Quantum	Theory	and	the	Schism	in	Physics”,	Routledge	
Popper,	K.R.	(1988):	“The	Open	Universe:	An	Argument	for	Indeterminism”,	Routledge	
Redhead,	M.	(1987):	“Incompleteness,	Nonlocality	and	Realism”,	Clarendon	Press	
Saunders,	S./Wallace,	D.	(2008):	“Branching	and	Uncertainty”,	http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3811	
Scheibe,	E.	(2006):	“Philosophie	der	Physiker”,	C.H.	Beck		
Sklar,	L.	(1992):	“Physics	and	Chance:	Philosophical	Issues	in	the	Foundations	of	Statistical	
Mechanics“,	Cambridge	University	Press		
Sklar,	L.	(2015):	“Philosophy	of	Statistical	Mechanics”,	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/statphys-statmech/		
Sober,	E.	(1993):	“Philosophy	of	Biology”,	Westview	Press	
Stanford,	K.	(2013):	“Underdetermination	of	Scientific	Theory”,	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	
Philosophy,	https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/		
Streater,	R./	Wightman,	A.	(1964):	“PCT,	Spin	and	Statistics”,	Princeton	University	Press	
Suárez,	M.	(2014):	“A	Critique	of	Empiricist	Propensity	Theories”,	Euro	Jnl	Phil	Sci	(2014)	4:	
215	
Suárez,	M.	(2015):	“Bohmian	Dispositions”,	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11403	
Suppe,	F.	(1974):	“The	Search	for	Philosophic	Understanding	of	Scientific	Theories”,	in:	
Suppe,	F.	(ed.):	“The	Structure	of	Scientific	Theories”,	University	of	Illinois	Press,	1974	
	78	
	
Timpson,	C.	(2011):	“Probabilities	in	Realist	Interpretations	of	Quantum	Mechanics”,	in:	
Beisbart,	C./Hartmann,	S.	(eds.):	“Probabilities	in	Physics”,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011		
Torretti,	R.	(1993):	“Creative	Understanding”,	University	of	Chicago	Press	
Uffink,	J.	(2011):	“Subjective	Probability	and	Statistical	Physics”,	in	C.Beisbart/S.Hartmann	
(eds.):	“Probability	in	Physics”,	Oxford	University	Press,	2011	
Vaidman,	L.	(2014):	“Many-Worlds	Interpretation	of	Quantum	Mechanics”,	Stanford	
Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/		
Valentini,	A.	(2010):	“Inflationary	Cosmology	as	a	Probe	of	Primordial	Quantum	Mechanics”,	
Phys.Rev.D	82:063513,	2010		
Volchan,	S.B.	(2006):	“Probability	as	Typicality”,	http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0611172		
Von	Neumann,	J.	von	(1932):	“Mathematische	Grundlagen	der	Quantenmechanik”,	Springer		
Wallace,	D.	(2001):	“Everett	and	Structure”,	arXiv:quant-ph/0107144v2	
Wallace,	D.	(2008):	“Philosophy	of	Quantum	Mechanics”,	in	Rickles,	D.	(ed.)	(2008):	“Ashgate	
Companion	to	Contemporary	Philosophy	of	Physics”,	Ashgate	
Wallace,	D.	(2011):	“Decoherence	and	Ontology,	or:	How	I	Stopped	Worrying	and	Love	
FAPP”,	https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.2189		
